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Abstract 
The present study investigates the potential for direct payment for biodiversity conservation 
implementation in the Congo Basin. A survey realized in 31 protected areas in the Congo 
Basin showed that some initiatives, starting with raising awareness, are used to raise local 
participation in conservation, but there are very few conservation agreements with local 
people. Attempt to biodiversity conservation in/around PAs is done through three main 
approaches. Indirect incentive approaches are the most used (63%) in front of direct 
incentives for sustainable biodiversity use (30%). Direct incentives for biodiversity 
conservation (7%) are quite new and are still not bound by conservation contracts. Five 
initiatives are being implemented including rewards for denunciating poachers (in 2 PAs), 
conservation of marine turtles in Campo Ma’an TUO, compensation of farmers for damages 
caused by wildlife in their farmland and paying a local community to set aside an area as no 
man’s land for carbon sequestration evaluation. Three other initiatives are still in their 
planning phase. They are conservation concession projects proposed by conservation 
organizations (WWF, CI and BCI) to governments of Cameroon, CAR and DRC. 
Use-restriction on some elements of the biodiversity like wildlife is likely to be the best PES 
scheme in the Congo Basin compared to area-based schemes, since people heavily depend on 
land for their livelihood. The success of the conservation contracts will depend on securing 
property rights, a careful evaluation of opportunity costs considering ways and customs of 
local people, a clear definition of indicators (people efforts and results), a democratic and 
equitable use of compensation funds and an establishment of a strong institutional framework 
and monitoring authority for contract enforcement. All this may involve high transaction costs 
to improve efficiency of payments. Conservation contracts in the Congo Basin may not be 
such a cheap way to achieve biodiversity conservation as thought by many conservationists. A 
part from biodiversity market, possible mechanisms to finance them can be Trust fund for PA 
management and the future REDD mechanism. Finally, government efforts in clarification of 
customary rights will be required. However, the efficiency of conservation contracts to 
achieve biodiversity conservation is widely recognized and there is a great interest of 
conservationists for direct payments for biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin. 
Key words: Congo Basin, biodiversity conservation, protected areas, incentives, local people, 
conservation contracts, direct payments, property rights, transaction costs, efficiency, REDD
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Résumé étendu 
Les populations rurales supportent d’importants coûts d’opportunité dus à la création des aires 
protégées. Ceci constitue un grand frein à leur implication dans la gestion de ces aires 
protégées. Des projets de conservation et de développement intégrés ont été introduits en vue 
d’accroître les revenus des populations locales et d’améliorer la gestion des parcs. Les 
résultats de tels projets restent toutefois mitigés en termes de conservation de la biodiversité. 
Face à cette situation de mécanismes innovateurs pour la conservation de la biodiversité sont 
entrain d’être mis en place par les conservationnistes. Au rang de ceux-ci se trouvent les 
paiements pour les services environnements (PSE) avec pour objectif de gratifier les acteurs 
qui maintiennent la biodiversité. L’objectif de ce travail est d’examiner les potentialités des 
mécanismes de paiement pour la conservation de la biodiversité des forêts du Bassin du 
Congo. Pour y parvenir les mécanismes de compensation des populations riveraines des aires 
protégées pour leur action dans la conservation de la biodiversité ont été recensés. Ceci a été 
réalisé au travers des questionnaires et des interviews auprès des conservateurs et des 
organisations d’appui à la gestion de 31 aires protégées du Bassin du Congo. 
Il ressort de cette étude que la gestion des aires protégées du Bassin du Congo est financée en 
grande partie par la communauté internationale qui serait le principal bénéficiaire de la 
conservation de la biodiversité. Ainsi, 42% des financements proviennent des fonds publics 
internationaux, 26% des fonds privés internationaux et 32% des fonds publics nationaux. En 
vue d’impliquer les populations locales à la conservation de la biodiversité, 3 types 
d’approches incitatives ont été développées. L’approche la plus courante est celle des 
incitations indirectes à la conservation qui représentent 63% des initiatives et visent la 
promotion du développement comme alternative à l’exploitation de la biodiversité. Dans cette 
catégorie se retrouvent la réalisation des projets de développement, la mise en place des 
activités alternatives et la formation des groupes socioprofessionnels. Les incitations pour 
l’utilisation durable de la biodiversité viennent en seconde position (30%) et visent la 
valorisation de la biodiversité en vue de sa gestion durable. On y retrouve l’écotourisme, la 
chasse sportive dans les zones d’intérêt cynégétique à gestion communautaire, la foresterie 
communautaire. La 3e approche est plus rarement pratiquée (7%) et vise directement la 
conservation de la biodiversité. C’est dans cette catégorie que rentrent les paiements directs 
pour la conservation de la biodiversité dans le cadre des PSE. Elle consiste à compenser, sur 
  
x
une base contractuelle, les populations locales pour la réduction ou l’abandon des droits 
d’usage qui constituent une menace pour la biodiversité.  
Huit exemples d’incitation directe à la conservation de la biodiversité ont été recensés. Ils 
peuvent être regroupés en deux systèmes :  
- l’un basé sur la surface où le contrat stipule la superficie de forêt à mettre hors 
d’usage. Trois exemples ont été recensés sous l’appellation de concession de conservation. 
Ceux-ci restent cependant encore des propositions, aucun projet n’ayant encore vu le jour. Ils 
sont calqués sur le modèle des concessions forestières. 
Présentation des propositions de concessions de conservation (CC) 
 Ngoila-Mintom Réserve Spéciale de 
Dzanga Sangha 
CC à Bonobo 
Pays Cameroun RCA DRC 
Superficie (ha) 546 814 237 000 681 000 
Organisation 
promotrice 
 
WWF et CI 
 
WWF 
 
CI 
 
- l’autre basé sur la restriction d’usage d’un élément de la biodiversité. Cinq exemples 
de compensation pour la restriction des droits d’usage ont été recensés. Il s’agit des 
rémunérations pour l’abandon de la pêche de tortues marine et de la chasse commerciale à 
travers la dénonciation des braconniers ; et le remboursement des dommages causés par la 
faune sur les cultures. Toutefois, ces rémunérations ne font pas encore l’objet des accords 
contractuels de conservation.  
La commercialisation des services environnementaux n’est mentionnée dans aucune des lois 
forestières du Bassin du Congo, ce qui n’exclut pas la mise en place des PSE. Toutefois, pour 
faciliter le développement des paiements directs pour la conservation de la biodiversité 
certaines conditions doivent être considérées. 
- Les droits d’usage et le foncier. Dans le contexte africain, les usagers des forêts n’en 
sont pas propriétaires. Cependant, les personnes ou communautés qui sont fournisseurs du 
service de conservation de la biodiversité devraient avoir des droits d’usage, de gestion et 
d’exclusion sur les ressources concernées. Ces droits doivent être sécurisés pour permettre le 
contrôle de l’accès aux ressources. Il est important de tenir compte des droits coutumiers dans 
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la reconnaissance et la sécurisation des droits d’usage et du foncier. Les forêts 
communautaires et les ZICGC seraient un atout pour la mise en place des mécanismes de PSE 
car elles donnent aux communautés des droits d’usage sécurisés sur les ressources forestières 
et fauniques. 
- Le type de système à mettre en place. Mettre en place un système basé sur la surface 
nécessite l’établissement d’un scenario de référence pour l’évaluation des efforts de 
conservation. Toutefois, un tel système limiterait le développement des populations rurales en 
réduisant leur accès à la terre dont ils dépendent grandement pour leur survie au travers de 
l’agriculture. Un autre frein à ce système est l’absence du droit de propriété des locaux sur la 
terre. Ainsi, un système basé sur les restrictions d’usage de certains éléments de la 
biodiversité apparaîtrait mieux adapté dans ce contexte. Ce système se focaliserait par 
exemple sur la conservation de certaines espèces emblématiques menacées d’extinction par le 
braconnage. Ces espèces, notamment les grands mammifères, les tortures marines et certaines 
espèces d’oiseaux, trouveraient plus facilement un marché auprès de la communauté 
internationale, principal acheteur potentiel des services de conservation de la biodiversité. 
- Les coûts d’opportunité. Les coûts d’opportunités subis par les acteurs locaux vont 
souvent bien au delà des revenus agricoles. Ils doivent être minutieusement évalués mais cela 
nécessite du temps et des efforts qui peuvent engagés des coûts de transaction élevés. 
Toutefois, ils doivent tenir compte de l’évolution des économies rurales et du désir des acteurs 
locaux d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie. Les coûts d’opportunité ne seront donc pas fixes 
tout au long des contrats et doivent être réévalués avec le temps.  
- Sous quelle forme payer les compensations? Compenser les acteurs locaux par 
paiement comptant les exposer à une dépendance poussée vis-à-vis du marché pour leur 
besoin de subsistance. Créer des marchés ruraux pour résoudre ce problème entraînerait des 
coûts de transaction élevés. Comme alternative, ces compensations pourraient être utilisées 
pour créer un fonds de développement local pour la mise œuvre des projets si le vendeur du 
service environnement est la communauté entière. Mais cette option ferait face au problème 
de détournement de fonds courant dans le Bassin du Congo. Ceci nécessite donc la mise en 
place d’un bon système de contrôle.  
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- Suivi et monitoring. Il est important d’avoir une autorité légale et légitime qui 
s’engage dans les contrats de conservation pour assurer le respect des clauses. Cette autorité 
doit être reconnue de toutes les parties prenantes et être apte à faire respecter les contrats.  
- Durabilité des financements. Les PSE fonctionnent sur le principe de l’existence d’au 
moins un bénéficiaire désireux de payer pour la production du service. Il est important de 
trouver d’autres sources de financements pour ces mécanismes au cas où les acheteurs 
venaient à ne pas être permanents. Dans ce cadre, il est possible d’envisager le financement 
des paiements directs pour la conservation de la biodiversité dans le futur mécanisme REDD 
ou dans les fonds fiduciaires pour le financement des aires protégées. 
Les PSE peuvent faire face à plusieurs obstacles dans le Bassin du Congo dont entre autre une 
faiblesse à faire respecter les lois et les contrats, la non sécurisation des droits d’usage et du 
foncier, les lenteurs administratives et l’appropriation des projets de développement par les 
élites, la grande dépendance des terres pour l’agriculture qui entraînerait des coûts 
d’opportunité élevés. Lever ces obstacles entraînerait des coûts de transaction élevés qui 
rendraient ce mécanisme plus cher que l’ont pensé certains auteurs.  
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I Introduction 
1.1 Background and significance of the research 
Since 1961, tropical countries have lost over 500 million hectares of forest cover (FAO, 2000)
 
and the consumption of forest products has risen by 50 percent worldwide within a period of 
30 years (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 1999).
 
This situation has lead to the loss of 
environmental services that play an important role in the livelihoods, economic development 
and health of human populations all around the world. The traditional response to this 
situation has been to promote forest conservation by introducing command-and-control 
measures in the form of laws and regulations (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). This requires the 
existence of proper institutional and financial resources, which are often lacking in developing 
countries. In this context, regulatory approaches to conservation often miss environmental 
objectives due to the weakness of the environmental enforcement system and generalized 
noncompliance with actual national and local concerns. In addition, it can be difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, to enforce conservation measures, land use regulations or specific 
agricultural / forest management practices upon poor communities who depend on resource 
exploitation for their livelihood. Regulatory approaches sometimes hurt these populations by 
banning activities that are essential for their livelihoods and pushing them toward illegal 
survival patterns (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). Moreover, the loss of biodiversity in tropical 
forests is a cause of global concern. However, the current costs of preservation are often not 
off-set by user values and it seems that the costs are disproportionally borne by the people 
living in areas rich in biodiversity. While most people would acknowledge that the total 
economic benefits - taking into account non-use values (existence and bequest values) - could 
easily compensate for the imposed costs, the issue of regional and intergenerational 
compensation remains to be tackled in a more satisfactory manner (Minten, 2003) 
Furthermore, the Brundtland Report (1987) and the Rio 1992 Earth Summit showed that 
conservation would become sustainable only if poverty was alleviated. Following this, 
Integrated Conservation Development Projects (ICDPs) and sustainable forest management 
emerged as the two major approaches to simultaneously increase local incomes and conserve 
the environment (Salafsky and Wollenberg, 2000; Pearce et al., 2003). ICDPs and 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management are indirect approaches to conservation. 
ICDPs were described by Franks and Blomley (2004) as approaches to the management and 
conservation of natural resources in areas of high biodiversity that aim to reconcile the 
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biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic development interests of multiple stakeholders 
at local, regional, national and international levels. Such projects encourage rural 
communities to maintain biodiversity by helping them to use it sustainably. They may also 
provide alternative sources of products, income, or social benefits (schools, wells, clinics, 
etc.) as a means of encouraging communities to cooperate. These kinds of efforts have been 
referred to as “conservation by distraction” (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). But such initiatives 
rarely work because people are more likely to incorporate new sources of income as 
complements to existing activities rather than as substitutes for them (Kiss, 2002; Ferraro, 
2001) 
Evaluation of these approaches showed that they didn’t achieve major shifts in tropical land-
use trends (Sayer 1995; Brandon et al. 1998) and having little impact on neither forest 
conservation nor rural development. A recent review of ICDPs declared that there was “a 
notable lack of successful and convincing cases where people’s development needs have been 
effectively reconciled with protected area management” (Wells et al., 1999, p.1). However, 
some authors attribute these shortcomings from the failure to recognize some realities of 
integrating conservation and development (Adam et al., 2004). 
This leads to the emergence of much debate around the need for new conservation paradigms. 
At the center of calls for more direct conservation approaches is the concept of Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Niesten and Rice, 2004). PES 
schemes are market-based approaches which focus on efficiency gains while complying with 
current environmental legislature. PES schemes can be more effective, flexible and cost-
effective than command-and-control strategies and the creation of traditional protected areas 
which is sometimes impossible due to socioeconomic and political considerations. Experience 
has shown that well designed market-based instruments can achieve environmental goals at 
less cost than conventional “command and control” approaches, while creating positive 
incentives for continual innovation and improvement (Stavins, 2000).  
Since mid-1990, PES systems evolved in many parts of the tropics, in particular in Latin 
America (Robertson and Wunder, 2005). The concept of PES started in Costa Rica in 1996 
when landowners accept to conserve their forest in return of a per-hectare annual payment. 
Such payment programs for biodiversity conservation are in various phases of development 
around the world. 
PES schemes are relatively new in the Congo Basin which hosts the world’s second-largest 
dense humid tropical forest after the Amazon. The biodiversity of the Congo Basin Forest is 
  
3
of global significance because of both, the high number of species found in the region, known 
as species richness, and the number of plant and animal species that exist nowhere else on the 
planet, known as endemism. Although Central Africa has a low rate of deforestation 
compared with other tropical forest areas, its forest are undergoing degradation hard to assess 
(FAO, 2003). The biodiversity is threatened by human activities such as deforestation mainly 
caused by slash-and-burn agriculture, logging, mining and infrastructure development 
(Barrett, 1999). This reduces environmental services rendered by these forests. PES 
approaches for biodiversity conservation are still at its beginning in the Congo Basin and they 
are not well documented. It is important to know how far they have been developed and 
implemented. Moreover if they have not been developed yet, an assessment of the potentials 
for PES is needed.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
The present study will investigate the potential for direct payment for biodiversity 
conservation implementation in the Congo Basin. Specifically, this study will:  
- Review literature concerning mechanisms of payments for biodiversity conservation; 
- Investigate the mechanisms used to involve local communities in biodiversity 
conservation in the Congo Basin Region; 
- Review the existing mechanisms of compensation; 
- Identify the different initiatives of payments for biodiversity conservation that exist in 
the Congo Basin; 
- Evaluate their potential effects and their limitations in terms of efficiency, equity and 
sustainability; 
- Analyze the feasibility of such payment mechanism for biodiversity conservation in 
the Congo Basin. 
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II Literature review on Payment for Biodiversity Conservation 
   
2.1 Definitions  
 
Biological diversity – or “biodiversity” for short – is a general term for the diversity of genes, 
species and ecosystems that constitute life on earth. It is defined in Article 2 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as “the variability among living organisms from 
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between 
species and of ecosystems.” (Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2).  
“In-situ conservation means the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the 
maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings and, 
in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have 
developed their distinctive properties.” (Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2). 
In the same Article 2, “Sustainable use” is defined as the use of components of biological 
diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological 
diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and 
future generations. This is achieved through sustainable forest management. It is agreed that 
sustainable forest management aims to ensure that the goods and services derived from the 
forest meet present-day needs while at the same time securing their continued availability and 
contribution to long-term development. In its broadest sense, forest management encompasses 
the administrative, legal, technical, economic, social and environmental aspects of the 
conservation and use of forests (FAO, 2008). 
The Dictionary of Environmental Economics defines the term “conservation” as the 
management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable 
benefit to the present generation while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and 
aspirations of future generations (Markandya et al., 2001). But according to the definitions 
provided in the CBD, these appear to be two alternate land use options of forests. The CBD 
presents then conservation as preservation of biodiversity which precludes any human use of 
forests, implying forests are preserved in their original or natural state without any human 
interference. This contrasts with sustainable use of biodiversity which also includes some 
conservation aspects. Hence different incentives have been used which promote either 
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sustainable use or conservation of biodiversity. The next section will highlight some 
differences in these two approaches of promoting biodiversity. 
For conservation efforts to be successful, high participation of local people is required. A lot 
of definitions of participation exist. Participation is a process through which stakeholders 
influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources 
which affect them (The World Bank, 1994). With regard to rural development, participation 
include people’s involvement in decision-making processes, in implementing programs, their 
sharing in the benefits of development programs and their involvement in efforts to evaluate 
such programs (Cohen and Uphoff, 1977). Participatory conservation is about sharing of 
decision-making control with communities and providing them incentives to compensate 
them for a loss of access to resources and to promote conservation behaviors and attitudes 
(The World Bank, 2008). 
 
2.2 Sustainable biodiversity use versus biodiversity conservation incentive 
agreements 
 
Sustainable biodiversity use and conservation incentives are two different approaches to 
achieve biodiversity conservation. The difference between the two is use and non-use of 
biodiversity. The first pursues indirectly biodiversity conservation with objectives of reduce 
effect on biodiversity and maintain it by using it sustainably to generate sustained long-term 
flow of biodiversity services from a given forest area. The second approach is direct with 
objective of maintain biodiversity by not using it at all for a long-term habitat maintenance of 
the target area (Niesten and Rice, 2004).  
On one side, sustainable biodiversity use promotes sustainable land use practices with hope to 
have conservation as a side benefit. Hence efforts of conservation refer to as “conservation by 
distraction” since conservation is somehow integrated into other development approaches 
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). On the other side, biodiversity conservation incentives target 
the decision of whether or not to harvest with the aim of keeping the integrity of the forest 
(intact natural ecosystems). Here, efforts are put only into conservation activities, biodiversity 
conservation is the core of any initiatives and hence conservation is targeted directly.  
Sustainable biodiversity use incentives intend users to forgo short-term “mining” of 
renewable resources in favor of managing them for long-term gains. Sometimes, they are a 
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project approach focusing too much on project activities rather than conservation effects 
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Biodiversity conservation incentives provide direct compensation in 
return for biodiversity conservation services. So, payments are conditional on conservation 
outcomes and income is a function of successful conservation. They are expected to be more 
cost-efficient than indirect approaches based on the principle that the cheapest way to get 
something you want is to pay for what you want rather than pay for something indirectly 
related to it (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). For example, an analysis of a conservation intervention 
in southeastern Madagascar indicates that with $ 4 million of conservation funds invested in 
annual payments conditional on the protection of forest, about 80% of the original forest 
could be protected. Using the same amount, only 12% of forest could have been protected 
through support of indirect incentives (Conrad and Ferraro, 2001). 
Both approaches have development benefits. While indirect approach seems to achieve 
conservation and development objectives simultaneously, biodiversity conservation incentives 
benefit poor farmers by improving cash flows and diversifying household income. But for 
some authors this is not a development benefit since paying an individual or community for 
“not doing something” might be seen as a form of social welfare rather than development 
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). 
 
  2.3 Payments for Environmental Services (PES)  
 
2.3.1 Definition of the concept and its origin 
The Dictionary of Environmental Economics defines environmental services as the ecological 
functions currently perceived to support and protect human activities of production and 
consumption or affect the overall human wellbeing in some way (Markandya et al., 2001). 
Payments for Environmental Services are relatively new schemes with a dual objective of 
increasing conservation and improving livelihood. The concept of PES has experienced 
growing interest over the last years in both developed and developing countries, notably the 
United States and Australia, but it is also increasingly recognized in developing countries 
such as in Costa Rica, Mexico or Kenya for example (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2006). PES is the 
name for a variety of arrangements through which the beneficiaries of ecosystem services pay 
back the providers of those services. 
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Although PES schemes are generally perceived as a means to internalize externalities, no 
unique definition of PES has been established so far. One could choose to define PES by the 
additive meaning of the terms it contains, as any “payment” somehow intended to promote 
“environmental services” (Wunder, 2005). 
Some consider all types of direct payments as PES, but others such as Wunder (2005) 
proposed to define PES more narrowly as: 
1. a voluntary transaction where  
2. a well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) 
3. is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer  
4. from a (minimum one) ES provider 
5. if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality). 
 
This definition raises the five criteria to describe PES and distinguish them from other similar 
incentive payments such as eco-subsidies or tax-cuts for environmentally-friendly actions 
(Wunder, 2005). PES is a voluntary, negotiated framework, which distinguishes it from 
command-and-control measures (criterion 1). There is a voluntary participation focuses on 
cooperation between stakeholders rather than constraint top-down type approach of natural 
resource management during the 1970s and 1980s. It must be clear what exactly is being 
bought - it can be a directly measurable service or land-use restrictions that are likely to help 
providing that service (criterion 2). In any PES, there should be resources going from at least 
one ES buyer (criterion 3) to at least one provider (criterion 4) in a direct transaction, though 
the transfer often occurs through an intermediary. Conditionality requirement demands ex-
post service remuneration (after the service has been rendered). User payments need to be 
truly contingent upon the service being continuously provided (criterion 5) 
 
  2.3.2 The idea of PES 
Environmental services are “externalities” or public goods by their nature characterized by 
their non-excludability and non-rivalry. As consequent, local land manager do not receive any 
compensation for conserving them, and thus ignore them in their private land use decision-
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making which often leads to the loss of environmental services (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2006). 
The logic of the argument underlying PES is as follows: when “free” environmental services 
are made scarce by human exploitation, they obtain an economic value. External service users 
might want to compensate local resource managers to ensure that the services they need will 
be provided now and in the future. Consequently, if such compensation is made, the local 
service providers receive an income for their additional protection efforts. 
The core idea of PES consists therefore of external ES beneficiaries making direct, 
contractual and conditional payments to local landholders and users in return for adopting 
practices that secure ecosystem conservation and restoration and thus provision of ES 
(Wunder, 2005). In this way, land users are expected to receive a direct incentive to include 
ES in their land use decisions, ideally resulting in more socially optimal land uses than in the 
absence of such payments.  
For other authors, on the other hand, PES is seen as transferable development rights (TDRs) 
(Panayotou, 1994). Producing environmental services, for example biodiversity conservation, 
leads to set aside land as habitat for biodiversity conservation resulting in high opportunity 
costs both in terms of current income and forgone development opportunities. Land owners 
should then be compensated for this foregone development opportunity since land is by far 
the most important capital asset in developing countries (Panayotou, 1994).  
Nevertheless, these two justifications of PES highlight the fact that landholders or users who 
choose land use that preserves forest and maintains or produces environmental services 
should be compensated for benefits foregone by not choosing alternative land use. PES 
appears then to be a new form of financing biodiversity conservation and a potential 
international mechanism for biodiversity finance. 
 
  2.3.3 Basic assumptions of PES 
PES is based on a willing buyer – willing seller model. This assumes that there is at least one 
seller who has a real threat on biodiversity and is willing to receive a compensation to forsake 
its destructive activities on the biodiversity. Biodiversity services sellers should be the actual 
land users, having de facto land- and resource use control capacities. Moreover, from an 
efficiency point of view, only those who constitute a credible threat to ES provision should be 
paid (Wunder, 2005). On the other hand, there is a buyer who benefits from biodiversity 
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services and is willing to pay for biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity services’ purchasers 
should be the actual users of biodiversity services (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2006). 
Assuming that potential service providers and buyers are well identified, there should be a 
precise knowledge of how (land use type) and what type of biodiversity commodity are 
generated or provided. Adequate institutional arrangements like property rights, contracts 
between service providers and buyers and monitoring systems should exist. Adequate 
governance structures such as clear identification of service providers and service buyers, as 
well as any intermediary agent, including their respective role and responsibilities are also 
relevant in proper functioning of PES (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2006). 
The payment must be more than the additional benefit to land users of the alternative land use 
and less than the value of the benefits gained by the service users, in order to change the 
behavior of the land owners and obtain a payment from the service beneficiaries. This means 
the benefits through conservation incentive agreements must outweigh returns from 
alternative uses of the target area and beneficiaries should not have to pay more than the value 
of the service to them. The payments can be invested in economic activities that will provide 
alternative jobs to forest users and improve human welfare (Niesten and Rice, 2004). 
Negotiated terms of a conservation incentive agreement can include, for example, a portfolio 
of activities to which annual payments will be directed. Transaction costs should be low in 
order to optimize the use of resources collected from beneficiaries. 
The common basic structural design of PES is presented in Figure 1 below: 
 
Source: Pagiola and Platais, 2002.
 
 
Figure 1: Basic structural design of PES 
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2.3.4 Different types of PES 
Although PES schemes distinguish themselves from other conservation tools, internally, they 
are also a quite diverse family. The main differences are:  
1- Based on the vehicles used to achieve conservation or restoration effects, we 
distinguish area-based schemes and product-based schemes. In area-based schemes, 
contracts stipulate land- and/or resource-use caps for a pre-agreed number of land 
units. Examples are conservation concessions (Niesten et al., 2004; Hardner and Rice 
2002). In product-based schemes, consumers pay a ‘green premium’ on top of the 
market price for a production scheme that is certified to be environmentally friendly, 
especially vis-à-vis biodiversity (Pagiola and Ruthenberg, 2002). 
2- According to who the buyers are, we distinguish public schemes and private schemes. 
In public schemes (e.g. in Costa Rica, Mexico, China), the state acts on behalf of ES 
buyers by collecting taxes and grants and paying alleged ES providers (Wunder, 
2005). Private schemes are more locally focused and buyers pay directly. Public 
schemes are generally larger in scope and have the state providing legitimacy, which 
many private schemes struggle hard for.  
3- Based on how the environmental services are produced, we distinguish “use-
restriction” and “asset-building” schemes. In the first one, PES schemes reward 
providers for conservation, for capping resource extraction and land development, or 
for fully setting aside areas such as for protected habitat. Here, landowners are paid for 
their conservation opportunity costs, plus possibly for active protection efforts against 
external threats (Hardner and Rice 2002). Asset-building schemes aim to restore an 
area’s environmental services, for example reforestation of a degraded landscape. 
 
It is important to choose the right scheme depending on the context since willingness to pay 
of service users will only raise if schemes can demonstrate clear additionality vis-à-vis 
established baselines (Wunder, 2005). Baseline represents what will hypothetically happen 
without the PES scheme. Wunder (2005) presented three different PES baselines where the 
yellow space represents the additionality (Figure 2). 
The static baseline assumes that forest carbon stocks remain constant in time; an example is 
current clean development mechanism rules. The declining (deteriorating) baseline assumes 
that forest cover will decrease in time. This is the case of tropical countries where 
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deforestation is an integral part of development and will continue in time. Improving scenario 
means forest cover increase over time; that is in countries with advanced forest transition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wunder (2005) 
Figure 2: Three fundamental PES baseline scenarios 
 
  2.3.5 Obstacles to PES 
Major obstacles to effective PES include demand-side limitations and a lack of supply-side 
know-how regarding implementation. Inadequate information, poorly defined property rights, 
a lack of organization or management capacity and other factors can impede landholders from 
responding even when appropriate incentives are in place (Wunder, 2007). 
There are specific legal and social obstacles making the application of a direct payment 
approach challenging in developing countries (Kiss, 2002), such as: 
‐ Insecure land property rights; 
‐ Rural populations mostly earn their living directly from subsistence agriculture or 
extraction of natural resources. There is then limited local opportunities for 
nonagricultural investment or employment 
‐ Property taxes do not exist. The financial incentives must therefore be provided as 
direct cash transfers, which is usually more difficult to implement than tax reliefs. 
‐ The weak judicial systems typical of many developing countries and the limited 
experience with and enforcement of legal contracts can make it difficult to obtain and 
enforce long-term legal commitments. Therefore, the most likely method is to provide 
the payments distributed over time.  
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‐ Working with small, dispersed farmers imposes high transaction costs.  A possible 
way to reduce transaction costs is to organize farmers into groups through which they 
can join an incentive program (Pagiola and Platais, 2002). 
 
  2.4 PES for biodiversity conservation 
 
The majority of the world’s remaining biodiversity is found in tropical developing countries, 
while the great majority of biodiversity supporters are from industrialized countries (Kiss, 
2002). Many conservation-related projects have been supported by World Bank and many 
other international donors and organizations (Hardner and Rice, 2002). Despite the high level 
of investments and efforts, the conservation community collectively can only point to some 
individual, localized successes, but taken as a whole, there is only little impact on stopping or 
even slowing the rising tide of biodiversity loss (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Like most people, 
landholders and resource users in developing countries make their decisions based mainly on 
their perceived self-interest, with a strong bias towards the short term. Unfortunately, the 
benefits of conserving biodiversity tend to be long-term, indirect and diffuse, while the 
benefits of activities that destroy or degrade biodiversity tend to be short-term, direct and 
easily captured by individuals (Kiss, 2002). The key question therefore is: how can we 
encourage those who make the land use decisions in these areas to forego the benefits 
associated with destructive activities in favor of conserving biodiversity? One way that 
biodiversity conservation can compete with destructive land uses is through conservation 
incentive agreements (Niesten and Rice, 2004). There is a need to encourage and reward 
landholders to achieve conservation outcomes through including biodiversity conservation in 
their land use decision. Therefore, landowners receive direct incentives in return for 
conservation services in the context of PES. 
The market for biodiversity conservation is primarily international due to the global nature of 
the services provided (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). Forest biodiversity is valued for a 
range of features, from its role in maintaining a stock of information for potential future use to 
its existence value. For the most part, these services are consumed internationally. While 
demand is broad-based, expressed willingness to pay is concentrated in the West and this 
willingness is translated into real payments for biodiversity protection by national 
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governments, international NGOs and increasingly by private companies (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002).  
 
  2.5 Types of biodiversity conservation commodities 
 
To market forest biodiversity, it is essential to clearly know what is been sold. Unless a unit of 
biodiversity can be defined, we must resort to the use of proxies, i.e. items that can be 
marketed in place of biodiversity to achieve the desired goals (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002). A range of commodities have been used to market forest biodiversity protection. 
Among these are biodiversity business shares, biodiversity credits/offsets, biodiversity-
friendly products, bioprospecting rights, concession easements, development rights, land 
lease/conservation concession, land acquisition, management contracts, protected areas, 
research permits (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).  
These commodities contribute to either sustainable biodiversity management or biodiversity 
conservation. Among those contributing to biodiversity conservation, there are: 
‐ Conservation easements. They refer to contracts between landowners and those who 
wish to protect or expand certain natural ecosystems (e.g. native forests), whereby the 
landowner is paid to manage their land in ways that achieve the desired conservation 
objective. 
‐ Development rights. The idea is to allocate development rights up to the selected 
limit, and to allow these to be purchased by landowners. The development right can 
also be sold to conservationists by the landowner who receives a compensation for 
conservation opportunity costs. 
‐ Land lease/conservation concession. Conservation concessions are essentially a land 
lease, involving the allocation of forest use rights in a defined area to the landlord who 
commits to protect the forest from unsustainable timber and NTFP harvesting. The 
right to protect forests is purchased from the government for an up-front payment and 
annual fees.  
‐ Land acquisition. Amongst the simplest approaches to capturing demand for 
biodiversity protection is to sell the land on which biodiversity exists. 
‐ Protected areas. Protected areas are formally designated by national authorities to 
protect a range of environmental services, including biodiversity. 
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2.6 Implementation of PES schemes for biodiversity conservation 
  2.6.1 Conservation Concessions 
Conservation concessions are time-bound agreements to conserve a given land area instead of 
developing or degrading it (Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). It was introduced to 
compete directly with use-related concessions such as timber. In its simplest form, a 
conservation concession can be arranged like a timber concession, whereby a logging 
company pays the government for the right to extract timber from an area of public 
forestlands. Rather than log the concession area, the conservation investor would pay the 
government for the right to preserve the forest intact (Rice, 2002).  
Some pilot experiences of conservation concession as direct biodiversity payments exist. 
Conservation concessions have been applied by Conservation International (CI) – for 
instance, in Guyana where a renewable 30-year agreement was signed in July 2002 with the 
national government to manage 80,000 hectares in southern Guyana for conservation. It also 
involved a separate agreement with three nearby communities establishing a voluntary 
community investment fund (Rice, 2002). In the CI strategy, the conservation concession 
follows the same legal model as a standard timber sales agreement, except that the land is held 
as a reserve rather than harvested for timber. The responsibility of governing the agreement 
and monitoring the forest was given to a nonprofit NGO known as the Amazon Conservation 
Association. According to the terms of the agreement, CI will pay market rates to protect the 
land for 30 years, with start-up costs and government fees (Ellison, 2003). Conservation 
concessions also benefited residents in 16 Amerindian communities near the forest through a 
renewable “voluntary fund” to provide social assistance to local residents such as agricultural 
training, technical support, and scholarships to children, and to support ecotourism projects 
(Denny, 2004). Another example is the 67.6 million hectare of forest estate that was granted 
in July 2001 to a Peruvian NGO (Asociación para la Conservación de la Cuenca Amazónica) 
as the Peru’s first conservation concession (Rice, 2002). 
 
  2.6.2 Conservation agreements 
Under a conservation agreement, national authorities or local resource owners agree to protect 
natural ecosystems in exchange for a steady stream of structured compensation from 
conservationists or other investors (Niesten and Rice, 004). The Conservation Agreement 
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specifies conservation actions to be undertaken by the resource users, and benefits that will be 
provided in return for those actions. The conservation actions to be undertaken by the 
resource users are designed in response to the threat to biodiversity (CI, 2007). The benefits 
are structured to offset the opportunity cost of conservation incurred by the resource users. In 
addition, the Conservation Agreement details the monitoring framework used to verify 
execution of the conservation actions, and the sanctions to be applied if conservation actions 
are not executed. 
Conservation agreements can be developed as conservation easements. The oldest effort of 
paying people to conserve land is the U.S. government’s multibillion dollar payments to set 
aside cropland (Ellison, 2003). Widely experienced in the US, conservation easements refer to 
contractual arrangements by which landholders transfer, in perpetuity, their land use rights 
over a given land parcel to a conservation agency for conservation purposes. Easements are 
either voluntarily sold or donated by the landowner who retains certain property rights and 
can live on and use their property (The Nature Conservancy, 2004).  
In the tropics, there have been some conservation agreements in Mexico (Ellison, 2003). One 
is a 15-year contract, signed in early 2000, between the Wildlands Project, five Mexican 
NGOs, and a land cooperative whose members pledged to protect old-growth forest in the 
Sierra Madre Occidental Mountains of northern Chihuahua. The government was not 
involved. The land cooperative agreed to surrender its rights to log the area in return for cash 
and benefits amounting to about half of what it might have earned from timber. This 
agreement has been a success for conservation (Ellison, 2003). A second Mexican project 
offered conservation incentives to residents of the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve, to 
protect forest in the core zone of the protected area. Despite the agreement, some logging was 
continuing by outsiders even in the core area of the reserve, where it is forbidden. 
In the case of Costa Rica, until 2002, conservation easements were developed on five-year 
contract basis with FONAFIFO (National Forestry Financial Fund), because of the 
uncertainty of future funding (Pagiola, 2002).  
 
2.6.3 Conditions under which these mechanisms have been implemented 
In Costa Rica, PES have been implemented under the Forestry Law N° 7575 enacted in 1996 
which recognizes four environmental services provided by forest ecosystems. Among these, 
  
16
there are biodiversity conservation services (Pagiola, 2002). The law provides the regulatory 
basis for the government to contract landowners for the services provided by their lands, and 
has established a financing mechanism for this purpose in the form of FONAFIFO. PES also 
arose in a context where an elaborate system of payments for reforestation and forest 
management and the institutions to manage it already existed (Pagiola, 2002). There, targeted 
lands were owned privately (Ferraro, 2001). 
In Guyana, the success of the conservation concessions is mainly due to the choice of the 
forest area where the conservation concession was set up. Primarily, the forest chosen was 
relatively remote and sparsely populated, with the closest village to the concession being 
located 50 miles away with approximately 63 households (Barnes et al., 2008). In addition, 
the conservation concession was located in a region where there was no competition for the 
bid on the land, and not much economic activity was taking place before the concessions were 
established (Ellison, 2003). The same conditions were observed for the conservation 
concession implementation in Peru. In both Guyana and Peru, the conservation concessions 
have added immediate value to land that was virtually unproductive and not immediately 
desirable.  
However, the situation was quite different in Guatemala where CI attempted to buy annual 
logging production from local communities on 75,000 hectares in the Maya Biosphere of the 
Northern Petén. CI faced intense opposition because the land was attractive for timber 
harvesting. Hence the communities protested the deal to devote their forest to sustainable 
timber harvest (Ellison, 2003). Based on this experience, it can be concluded that 
conservation concessions may work well only in place like Guyana, where the opportunity 
cost of land is low, and where there is no effort to withdraw existing activities (Ellison, 2003). 
 
2.7 Implementation of PES for biodiversity conservation in Africa 
 
Well-known in Latin America, PES for biodiversity conservation are relative new in Africa 
(Walker, 2007). There are only few initiatives being implemented in East and South Africa 
especially in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania. Today, however, PES in Eastern 
and Southern Africa primarily occurs on an ad hoc basis through small-scale pilot projects. 
Information gaps, lack of capacity to design and manage projects and the absence of 
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institutions to support on-the-ground implementation have largely hindered efforts to scale up 
(Katoomba Group, 2008). 
In Uganda, Kenya and South Africa, some PES projects have been developed but only few are 
under implementation. In Tanzania, no project has been implemented yet. As far as PES for 
biodiversity conservation is concerned, just 2 projects were identified to be under 
implementation in Uganda and in Kenya (Katoomba Group, 2008). 
In Kenya, the project consists of direct payment as a mechanism for conserving important 
wildlife corridor links between the Nairobi National Park and its wider ecosystem. The 
project is implemented by The Wildlife Conservation Lease Program. The project is at his 
operational phase. The lease program currently covers about 14,000 acres of the 2,200 km2 of 
the Athi-Kapiti plains. The program has been implemented in Kitengela of Kajiado District. It 
is a private contract between the landowners and those running the lease program. 
Conservation Management Practices are as follow: no fencing, quarrying, cultivation or 
subdivision and the sustainable management of the land for Wildlife and grazing. Direct 
Payments at ksh 300/acre per year are given to the landowners from the Wildlife Lease 
program. Buyers of the services are Friends of Nairobi National Park, Wildlife Foundation 
and Kenya Wildlife Service. The Wildlife Foundation implements the lease program with 
financial support from Friends of Nairobi National Park and the International Fund for 
Animal Welfare. The African Wildlife Foundation, the African Conservation Centre and ILRI 
provided technical support for the implementation (Katoomba Group, 2008). No evaluation of 
the success of this project has been found in the literature. 
In Uganda, the project Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT) 
was set up in 1994 under the Uganda Trust Act. Though the sellers of the biodiversity service 
are the communities living in and around Mgahinga and Bwindi National parks and the 
Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), it is a deal between the Government of Uganda and the 
World Bank – GEF. The project is located in south-west Uganda, in Kabala and Kisoro 
districts. Here, the service been paid for is the conservation of the biodiversity in the two 
national parks financed by an endowment fund set aside by the GEF. The buyers of the 
service are GEF, World Bank and the Government of Uganda. The World Bank/GEF 
contributed the original capital for the fund worth US $ 4 million. The Government of Uganda 
and the World Bank decided to invest the fund offshore. MBIFCT manages the resources in 
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the national park on behalf of the endowment partners and the citizens of Uganda. The 
endowment funds are managed by Merrill Lynch Investment (UK) and the revenues generated 
are used to pay for the conservation activities. 40% of the revenue goes to the local 
community associations and 60% to UWA. 
 
  
19
III Methods 
The present study was carried out in six countries of the Congo Basin area: Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
and the Republic of the Congo. The chapter will present methods used for data collection and 
analysis. 
3.1 Identification of interviewees 
 
As we will mention in the next chapter, biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin in the 
past was mainly done through the establishment of protected areas. Hence, lot of conservation 
funds and efforts has been directed towards protected areas to achieve conservation 
objectives. These funds have been used to support not only the management of protected 
areas, but also some initiatives implemented in their surroundings to address poverty of local 
communities affected by biodiversity conservation. It has been shown that many ICDPs 
concentrated only on areas of significant biodiversity, and often just on protected areas (Wells 
et al. 2004). For these reasons, we focused most in protected areas to identify mechanisms of 
incitation and compensation of local communities for biodiversity conservation. 
The initial step in data collection was to make a list of all protected areas existing in the six 
countries of the Congo Basin. 25 protected areas have been identified in Cameroon, 14 in 
Congo, 13 in Gabon, 12 in Equatorial Guinea, 16 in Central African Republic and 21 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (See Annex 1 for the complete list of those protected areas). 
Then managers and organizations supporting the management of each protected area were 
identified for the interviews.  
Two categories of interviewees were identified: 
1- Those working directly on protected area management. This regroups protected area 
managers established by the government; and national and international NGOs 
supporting the management through implementation of conservation and/or 
development projects in and around protected areas. 
2- Conservationists not working directly on protected areas’ management but working on 
conservation issues in Congo Basin. In this category, we have mainly people working 
in conservation NGO with an interest on development of payment for environmental 
services’ mechanisms. 
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With the help of at least one contact person in each country, we were able to identify potential 
interviewees who were then contacted either by email or by phone. A request for participating 
in the survey was sent to all these identified people involved in protected area management 
and biodiversity conservation. From the 132 actors requested to participate in the survey, 66 
replied among which 64 agreed to participate. Annex 2 presents the list of institutions 
contacted in each country. Questionnaires were later on sent for the first time to those who 
replied positively to the request and later to all those contacted in the beginning. Above all, 
only 48 questionnaires were returned. International conservation organizations like WWF, 
WCS and ECOFAC supporting protected area management were extensively canvassed.  
 
3.2 Questionnaires 
 
Two different types of questionnaires were used according to the 2 categories of actors we 
had to examine.  
The questions focused on the following aspects (see Annexes 3 and 4 for the complete 
questionnaires) 
- Brief presentation of the protected area (This part was not included in the 
questionnaire for survey of biodiversity conservation actors, non-managers of 
protected areas); 
- Existence of direct payment mechanisms for biodiversity conservation; 
- Description of compensation mechanisms; 
- Utilization of compensation funds; 
- Importance of legal and administrative context; 
A briefing note was attached to the questionnaires (see Annex 5). This contained a short 
presentation of the context of the research and introductory information about payment for 
environmental services, with a main focus on direct payments for biodiversity conservation. 
The purpose of this briefing note was to give the interviewees a general introduction about 
direct payments for biodiversity conservation, in order to help them identify and present likely 
mechanisms in Congo Basin; and distinguish them with other mechanisms. 
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3.3 Interviews 
 
Questionnaires were sent to the interviewees who completed them and sent them back. To 
supplement the information, interviews were done either by phone, e-mail or face-to-face 
depending on the preference of the interviewees. Not all questionnaires were returned (Table 
1) and it was not possible to have a direct interview with all the identified people because of 
their unavailability. Communication difficulties in the sub-region also considerably hampered 
the return of mail and therefore the number of responses to the survey since we were only able 
to visit two of the six countries (Cameroon and DRC). 
Table 1: Number of questionnaires sent and returned per country. 
Countries Number of 
questionnaires sent
Number of 
questionnaires 
returned  
Number of protected 
areas concerned with the 
returned questionnaires 
Cameroon 30 15 12 
Congo 17 7 5 
Gabon 33 9 4 
Equatorial Guinea 3 1 1 
Central African 
Republic 
10 3 1 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
39 13 8 
Total 132 48 31 
Source: Own data 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
All the questionnaires were examined and entered into Microsoft Excel software which was 
used to analyze the data. The conservation activities were divided into initiatives with and 
without incentives. Concerning initiatives with incentives we distinguished between direct 
and indirect incentives and between sustainable use and conservation approaches. 
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The potential for implement direct payment for biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin 
was assessed through the evaluation of existing mechanisms of compensation for biodiversity 
conservation in protected areas and the use of literature.  
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IV The context of biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin 
Congo Basin forest extends from the coast of the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the mountains 
of the Albertine Rift in the east (Figure 3). It encompasses an area of approximately 2 million 
square kilometers covering 6 countries - Cameroon, Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.cbfp.org/tl_files/archive/evenements/brazza2005/biodiversity.pdf 
Figure 3 : Congo Basin Forest 
 
4.1- Regional cooperation for conservation 
 
Regional collaboration for biodiversity conservation in Central Africa started in 1996 when 
Forests and Environment Ministers from the region including NGOs and international 
organizations signed a declaration on forest conservation: the Brazzaville Process. This was 
followed by the Yaoundé Forest Summit in 1999, which elevated forest conservation in the 
region to a higher political level. At the end of the summit, the Heads of State from six 
Central African nations - Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) - signed the Yaoundé Declaration in the 
presence of representatives from the international community notably the World Bank, United 
Nations and European Commission. Thus, the leaders pledged to create new forest protected 
areas, promote responsible forestry and adopted plans to combat illegal logging and poaching 
(COMIFAC, 2005).  
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Containing specific commitments to forest conservation and sustainable forest management, 
the Declaration has resulted in solid conservation achievements, including the setting up of 
millions of hectares of new forest protected areas, increased funding, cross-border 
conservation cooperation, and establishment of a regional body, the Commission of Ministers 
in charge of Forests in Central Africa (COMIFAC) to coordinate regional conservation 
initiatives. A seventh Central African nation, the Democratic Republic of Congo, has since 
signed the Yaoundé Declaration. Furthermore, a broad-based group of governments, 
implementers and donor partners have come together since the Yaoundé Summit, to address 
the issue of creating trans-border protected areas, harmonizing national forest policies, and 
encouraging greater participation of rural populations in forest management (COMIFAC, 
2005).  
 
At Brazzaville summit in 2005, the Africa’s first regional treaty on conservation and 
sustainable management of forests, the COMIFAC Treaty, was signed. A strategic 
convergence plan called the “Plan de Convergence” for the implementation of the Yaoundé 
Declaration has been finalized and endorsed by COMIFAC. This involved the compilation of 
the different action plans identified by the member states. Priority activities were later 
identified from the Plan de Convergence. This plan has been updated and its implementation 
started in 2003 and extends till 2013 with three-year evaluation phases. The 4th strategic axis 
concerned biodiversity conservation with a focus on reinforcement of national protected area 
networks, joint management of trans-border protected areas and zones, and conservation of 
genetic plant resources. 
 
At the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the Congo Basin 
Forest Partnership (CBFP) has been launched. The objective of this initiative is to provide 
support to efforts to conserve and develop the Congo basin forests. It supports then the 
implementation of the Yaoundé Déclaration. Association of more than 40 governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, it involves the United States, The United Kingdom, France, 
the European Union, World Bank, ITTO, etc. Working as a facilitator, the CBFP organizes 
dialogue and promoted cooperation between the partners, sets up a work program based on 
the guidelines established in the COMIFAC Convergence Plan (CBFP, 2008). 
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4.2- Approaches used for Biodiversity Conservation in the Congo Basin 
 
Conservation actions in the Congo Basin are primarily concerned with large parks and areas 
located in "hot spots" of biodiversity, as well as in endemism centers, and they cover for most 
several hundred square kilometers (Perrings and Gadgil, 2002). Hence, biodiversity 
conservation in Congo Basin has mainly been done by declaring certain tracks of forests as 
protected areas. Conservation has begun in Congo Basin by the end of 19th century with the 
creation of the first elephant reserve (CBFP, 2006). The first national parks were established 
from 1925, but till 1970s they remained focused essentially on savannas and their wildlife. 
Forest protected areas have been established only from 1970 with the creation of the national 
park of Salonga (in DRC) and their number increased during 1980s, at the same time with the 
development of forestry. So key element of any biodiversity conservation strategy is those 
protected areas which are supposed to contain representative biodiversity of the country or the 
region. 
The conservation based only on the big wildlife and the creation of national parks has turned 
out inadequate in forest environment. So, the focus on the bid wildlife had left the place to a 
much more global vision of the ecosystems where the human populations are taken into 
account and the conservation is envisaged in a scale exceeding widely that of protected areas. 
Following the Yaoundé Déclaration, and with the support of ECOFAC Program, CARPE 
activities and conservation NGOs, conservation has been moved to a widely scale and 
Landscape concept has been introduced. The interest of Landscape concept is not only in the 
fact of joining protected areas in a wider context, but also and especially of integrating local 
communities which act directly or indirectly on these protected areas, in the processes of the 
conservation (CBFP, 2006). The Landscapes approach aims at a better conservation of the 
biodiversity inside the national parks by containing these in a gradual matrix of lessening 
threats as we get closer to the limit of the protected areas. U.S. partnership actions through 
CARPE program initially focused on 11 forest landscapes which are  ecologically sensitive 
and biologically diverse areas and wildlife corridors viewed as the most vulnerable to 
deforestation and other threats to biodiversity. In 2006, the Virunga landscape in the DRC and 
Rwanda became the 12th landscape. Together, these landscapes comprise more than 80 
million hectares of critically important tropical forest in Central Africa (USAID, 2007). 
Every Landscape is developed from one or several kernels - generally protected areas - where 
the conservation of the biodiversity dominates on the other land use forms. The protected 
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areas remain the only spaces protecting relatively intact ecosystems in a set of more or less 
transformed environments and the national parks are the only spaces where conservation 
remains the first priority. 
 
4.3- Protected areas and conservation in Congo Basin 
 
Following IUCN classification, protected areas of Congo Basin mainly belong to categories II 
and IV. Three IUCN categories of protected areas are little or not represented in the sub-
region. These are complete reserves (category I), natural monuments (category III) and 
protected landscapes (category V) (Doumenge et al., 2001). In 2006, surface of protected 
areas in Congo Basin was as presented in Table 2 (CBFP, 2006). But new protected areas 
have been created with time. 
 
Table 2: Surface of protected areas 
 Area of 
conservation 
forests 
Area of I-II 
IUCN categories 
Area of IV 
IUCN categories  
Protected forests 
in Landscapes 
 1000 
ha 
% 1 1000 
ha 
% 1 1000 
ha 
% 1 1000 
ha 
% 2
Cameroun 2346 11.9 1538 7.8 808 4.1 1257 53 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
515 27.1 354 18.6 161 8.5 382 74 
Gabon >2919 13.2 2919 13.2 ? ? 2778 95 
CAR 476 7.6 122 1.9 354 5.7 458 96 
Congo 3265 14.7 2143 9.6 1123 5.0 3211 98 
DRC 8989 8.3 6189 7.3 5245 2.9 7562 84 
Central Africa 18510 10.2 13263 7.3 5245 2.9 15648 84 
 
(1) According to total forest area of the country 
(2) According to total area of protected forests of the country 
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V Results: State-of-the-art on incentives for sustainable biodiversity 
management and conservation in the Congo Basin 
 
5.1- Protected areas in the Congo Basin 
5.1.1- Activities implemented 
Local communities who live within and nearby protected areas and who depend on forests for 
their livelihood can greatly influence conservation efforts through their attitudes and 
perceptions of biodiversity. In this way, local people are more and more involved in the 
management of protected areas in the Congo Basin. We observed that many initiatives are 
actually done in order to support biodiversity conservation in protected areas and promote the 
development of communities living around them. These initiatives are realized either by the 
government or by supporting organizations. They aim to reduce human threats on biodiversity 
preserved in protected areas. These threats include poaching, uncontrolled pasture and fishing, 
timber and firewood extraction, and agriculture. The initiatives that are actually used to 
reduce them will be presented in details later in the next sections. But in general, these 
initiatives bring some incentives to local communities to change their behavior to more 
environment-friendly practices. They can be grouped in three categories: indirect incentives 
for biodiversity conservation, direct incentives for sustainable biodiversity use and direct 
incentives for biodiversity conservation. These incentives do not exclude each other and are 
often used simultaneously in the same area.  
Figure 4 presents the distribution of existing initiatives in incentive categories. It shows that 
the majority of activities implemented in and around protected areas use indirect incentives 
for biodiversity conservation. This is what is commonly known as integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDP) which have been widely used in conservation initiatives since 
the 1990s. The idea is to promote global biodiversity through projects for economic and social 
development. Even if the effectiveness of ICDPs to achieve biodiversity conservation is 
hardly proved (Sayer, 1995; Brandon et al., 1998), it is still the main approach used nowadays 
in the Congo Basin. Direct incentives for biodiversity conservation are quite new and have not 
yet really been implemented. As, observed, only 7% of conservation initiatives fell in this 
category. This shows that Congo Basin countries continue to experiment with indirect 
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interventions to promote ecosystem conservation, rather than more direct contracting 
approaches using direct payments to achieve conservation. 
 
Source: Own data 
Figure 4: Frequency of incentive categories 
 
5.1.2- Funding sources 
Management activities of protected area are financed from different sources including 
international public and private funds, and national public funds.  
International public funds come from different industrialized countries. These funds come 
mainly from the following sources: French Global Environment Facility, French Development 
Agency, Netherlands Department General of International Cooperation (DGIS), European 
Union, British High Commission, German Cooperation (GTZ, KfW), European Development 
Fund, International Tropical Timber Organization, United State Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Global Environment Facility, UNESCO and African Park 
Foundation. 
International private funds are made of financial support from different sources to 
environmental NGOs acting in the management of protected areas. Environmental NGOs 
which are quite active in Congo Basin countries are WWF and WCS. Government budget 
allocations target mostly salaries of park rangers, managers and other government staff. 
The figure 5 presents the contribution of the different sources of funding for biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable development activities around the Congo Basin. It is important 
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to note that the funds do not go directly to people, but they receive it in form of trainings, 
support of their activities, material and equipment. Deals are concluded either with local 
associations, professional groups, village committees or traditional leaders.  
 
Source: Own data 
Figure 5: Funding sources for protected area management in the Congo Basin 
The graph shows that the conservation of biodiversity is mainly supported by the international 
community. The same report was done by IUCN (IUCN, 1999) who found out that between 
1992 and 1998, approximately US $ 100 million were invested by external donors from 16 
countries in conservation projects in Africa. This can be explained by the fact that 
international community perceives biodiversity conservation more favorably than local 
government and want to support conservation activities. It points out the interest of 
international community to conserve biodiversity and highlights by the same time its 
willingness to pay for it.  
Identification of the international community as beneficiary of biodiversity conservation 
implies that it can be a potential buyer for that service. This is a first step in the process of 
implementing payment for biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin. It is an important 
step since PES is based on a willing buyer – willing seller model assuming there is at least 
one buyer who benefits from biodiversity conservation services and is willing to pay for it. 
But, the magnitude of the benefits received by international community is still needed to be 
identified to help design mechanisms to capture some of these benefits and make them 
available for conservation (Pagiola et al, 2004). The way in which actual funds received from 
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international community are invested in conservation activities can be improved to shift from 
indirect to more direct incentives for biodiversity conservation.  
 
5.2- Participation of local communities in biodiversity conservation  
 
Policy initiatives in the Congo Basin to declare protected areas formally excluded local or 
indigenous communities from their planning and implementation, without giving them a stake 
in conservation or providing sustainable livelihood options. The management which has been 
command-and-control type led to many conflicts between protected areas managers and local 
communities. This is common in developing countries and it can affect the success of these 
policy initiatives (Ninan et al, 2007). Nowadays, policy initiatives have started to focus 
attention on social costs of conservation and many initiatives have been developed to involve 
local communities in the creation and management of protected areas. In this context, 
“Technical Operational Units” have been introduced in Cameroon to better involve local 
communities in conservation activities. These geographical areas are a combination of 
national parks, surrounded by forest concessions, safari hunting zones and agro-forestry areas; 
and are sparsely populated.  
Local communities are involved in conservation through raising awareness and addressing 
their activities. They are also involved in management activities and decision making 
processes through strengthening their governance capacity and employing them. These 
activities are mainly implemented by national and international supporting NGOs.  
 
  5.2.1- Raising awareness and environmental education 
Awareness and environmental education programs have been implemented in all of the 31 
protected areas surveyed. Awareness focuses on the importance of biodiversity and its 
conservation. In this context, many meetings which aim to induce positive behavior towards 
forest conservation are held with local populations as well as customary political authorities. 
Conservation education programs are conducted using various locally adapted awareness 
materials such as radio broadcasting, films, pamphlets, posters; all addressing key issues of 
conservation. Environmental education improves in diffusion of information and laws of 
nature conservation. There is also capacity building of local communities on resources 
management.  
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For an active participation, some trained members assume the responsibility of educating their 
whole community. This help to ensure the sustainability of the education in resource 
management. A typical example is the program of community support, environmental 
education and participatory mapping carried out by WWF in the Landscape Salonga-Lukenie-
Sankuru in DRC. To make the organization of meetings easier and increase their participation, 
landscape communities are divided in three groups. Representatives of communities are 
sensitized and trained by WWF. They have the responsibility to organize restitution meetings 
in their respective communities to release information about the project. They are also in 
charge of collecting data for the project during dialogue meeting at community level. 
 
  5.2.2- Strengthening local organizational structures for joint management 
After awareness and environmental education, the next step involving local communities is 
the creation of local structures for participatory management. Table 3 presents the activities 
carried out in the process of joint management and how often they exist. 
Table 3: Activities for joint management  
Activities Frequency 
Creation of local structure for joint management 67% 
Employment for local people 61% 
Involvement of local people in the planning of activities 23% 
Demarcation of PA and zoning of surrounding areas 23% 
Creation of vigilance committees in the communities 20% 
 
These local structures already existed in communities around 67% of protected areas 
investigated in this study. They are sometimes called community conservation committees, 
committees of dialogue, village committees for wildlife, dialogue committees or forest 
watching committees. They include all stakeholders with regard to natural resources of the 
protected areas. The role of these committees is to represent the communities in management 
decisions of the protected area and its surroundings. They constitute platforms for the 
exchange of information with local people. Some agreements have been signed between park 
managers and these committees stating the responsibilities of each party. Each party should 
respect the agreed deal for a better preservation of the park resources. When reforestation 
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activities have to be done, these committees are in charge of sensitizing the population to 
increase their participation. They are also in charge of informing them on conservation laws 
and of coordinating conservation activities and development projects at the local level. They 
constitute a key element for joint management. 
Local communities are involved in planning of management activities in 23% of protected 
areas. They participate in these activities through their representatives democratically 
appointed. Community representatives are involved in the demarcation of protected area, the 
boundary verification and in the zoning of the surrounding areas. They are trained in tourism 
activities. After training they are recruited as either forest guards to assist with protection 
activities or tourist guides. They are fully involved in the anti-poaching activities through 
vigilance committees. Jobs and training opportunities offered and their participation in the 
zoning of the areas increases their ownership of the protected area. Hence, they use only the 
buffer zones and biodiversity in the core zone of the parks is preserved. The trend is now to 
consider their opinion in the decision whether or not to create protected areas. 
 
  5.2.3- Employment for local people 
Offering jobs and employments was also presented in 61% of protected areas investigated as a 
mean to involve local people in the management. Table 4 presents the different employment 
opportunities and how often they are offered compared to each other. 
Table 4: Types of employment offered and their distribution 
Employment Distribution 
Forest guards or rangers 22% 
Watchmen in anti-poaching activities 8% 
Tourist guides 20% 
Trackers and carriers 11% 
Project staff 8% 
Monitoring of activities 6% 
Reforestation 11% 
Laborers 14% 
Total 100% 
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Local people are employed at different levels and the main jobs offered to them include forest 
rangers and tourist guides. They are also temporarily employed and paid according to the task 
in monitoring and management activities or for infrastructure building in development 
activities. For tourism, guides, trackers and carriers are recruited from local communities. 
Local people are increasingly recruited as full-time or part-time employers in conservation 
organization itself. This has a double-objective: while improving livelihood of some members 
of the communities through salaries they receive, it prevents them to get involved in 
biodiversity destructive activities. As staff of conservation organizations, they have signed 
that they should observe conservation norms and should not carry out illegal activities. 
Development projects around protected areas also employ local people at different levels to 
carry out activities.  
 
  5.3- Indirect incentives for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
These are initiatives that aim at promoting development in order to reduce people dependency 
on natural resources. 
5.3.1- Development projects  
Development micro-projects are the main activities implemented in the surroundings of PAs. 
They exist in more than 90% of PAs investigated in the Congo Basin. They are mainly carried 
out by national or international NGOs having different financial sources to support the PA 
management. NGOs objective is to address the drivers of deforestation and to promote the 
development of local communities whose access to natural resources is restricted by the 
creation of the PA. These activities are preceded by socio-economic studies to identify 
development needs of the populations. Funds are used either for social micro-infrastructures 
directly implemented by the NGOs in the villages, or to support local community 
development initiatives. In 26% of cases, the money is also used to finance micro-projects 
submitted by local people through the development committees. It is used to create a local 
development fund for micro-projects in 12% of PAs investigated. 
There exists a contract between local communities - represented by local conservation 
committees - and NGOs supporting their development to achieve better conservation of 
resources. They contain restrictions to the access to resources and regulations concerning the 
participation in combating illegal activities. As their part in the deals, NGOs will finance 
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development projects submitted by local communities. For example, the GTZ provided 
financial support to improve school equipments and water supply, and to promote goat 
breeding in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park. In return, local people should not poach inside 
the park and should participate in anti-poaching by denunciating illegal hunters.  
Their logic behind implementing development projects is based on the evidence that 
conservation will be undermined unless poverty is alleviated (Adams et al 2004). Poverty 
appears then to be one of the main drivers of deforestation which should be reduced to 
achieve biodiversity conservation. To alleviate poverty, NGOs bring development 
interventions and create alternative income sources for local people in return for setting aside 
land for conservation. It is also a form of compensation to local people for the loss of income 
since they depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. Through this, NGOs want to get 
the support of local people to conserve protected areas. Despite the fact that studies found that 
most of them have achieved little success, especially in terms of forest conservation, (Wells 
and Brandon, 1992; Wunder, 2001), many of such activities are still carried out around 
protected as mentioned before. 
 
  5.3.2- Training of socio-professional groups 
With the help of socio-economic studies, the main socio-professional groups are identified. 
They are also called thematic commissions in some places like in the landscape Salonga-
Lukenie-Sankuru. The objective is to ensure better awareness, discussion and training and to 
better address the impact of each socio-professional group on biodiversity conservation. 
These groups gather people having the same activities or the same impact on natural 
resources. We can distinguish for example: 
- Hunters influencing wildlife; 
- Farmers, local loggers, beekeepers, NTFP collectors using forest resources; 
- Fishers having an impact on fishery resources; 
- Traditional leaders having an impact on governance and access to the resources. 
Meetings and training are held with these groups separately which improves their 
involvement in forest conservation and sustainable use. Managers can therefore negotiate with 
them on how to carry out their activities with respect to the PA established. The idea is to 
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control their activities and make them more environment-friendly in the buffer zones and to 
prevent them in the core zones of PAs. These groups receive training on how to make their 
activities more sustainable with regard to biodiversity. An example for such an activity, which 
will be discussed in the next section, is the development of husbandry as an alternative to 
poaching. Hence, another main objective behind organizing people in socio-professional 
groups is the promotion of alternative activities.  
These socio-professional groups often receive some material incentives to improve their 
practices. For example in Mbam and Djerem National Park in Cameroon, a deal was signed 
between fisher groups and the park administration for sustainable fishing along the Djerem 
River inside the park. Utilization of poisonous product and small mesh fishing nets are 
forbidden. At the entrance of the park, there is a check-point where the fishing equipment is 
checked before the fishers can enter. At the same point, fishing harvests are checked when the 
fishers leave the park. The time spent inside the park is also limited. Fishers are also trained in 
sustainable fishing and they receive fishing and other equipment based on their expressed 
needs. These activities of sustainable fishing are supported by international donors through 
the channel of WCS. According to WCS, these activities have successfully reduced poaching 
inside the park, since fishers were poaching inside the park in the past while pretending to be 
fishing. 
 
  5.3.3- Alternative activities 
Alternative activities are driven by some assumptions (Hughes and Flintan, 2001): 
- Local people and their livelihood practices comprise the most important threat to the 
biodiversity resources of one area; 
- Unless the basic needs of people living in and around biodiversity-rich areas are met, 
they will not support (or will be hostile to) conservation efforts. 
Hence to achieve conservation, impacts of local communities on biodiversity should be 
mitigated by providing them with alternatives to natural resource-dependent livelihoods. 
Alternative projects are developed for those activities found harmful to biodiversity. Local 
people are trained and provided with some equipment to change their habits and practice new 
activities that are not or are less harmful to biodiversity. Alternatives activities are 
implemented in the surroundings of 60% of the investigated PAs. In this context, several 
livestock husbandry projects have been developed as an alternative to poaching. Depending 
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on the local people’s choice, either pig or poultry husbandry has been supported. Moreover, 
fish farming has been promoted as an alternative for fishing in rivers crossing the PAs. 
In some cases the same resources can be used by different users. In such a situation, managers 
said that they usually identify the users having the most harmful impact on the resources to be 
preserved and provide them with alternatives. For example, mangroves preserved in the 
Akanda National Park in Gabon have been threatened by women for fire wood and by fishers 
for fish smoking. Fishers have the most harmful impact on mangroves since they require big 
quantities of wood. They have been collecting wood for a long time and it was difficult to 
stop this practice even with control and repressive measures used by park managers. It 
appeared important to address fishers in order to reduce the pressure on mangroves. UNDP 
through CADDE NGO trained fishers and provided them with new smoking stoves and 
sawdust collected from sawmills. This can be seen as a compensation to fishers for restricting 
their access to mangrove. In return, they have to stop collecting wood from mangroves for 
smoking fishes and they should also participate in mangrove regeneration activities. 
Regeneration of destroyed parts of the mangrove is financed by FFEM and carried out by 
local wage laborers.  
 
5.4- Direct incentive initiatives for sustainable use of biodiversity  
 
Biodiversity is in the hands of people, and poor rural communities or landowners will not 
choose to conserve biodiversity unless it is beneficial to them in real and concrete terms, 
particularly since conservation is at their own cost. For these reasons, many initiatives have 
being taken to share benefits from biodiversity with local people in order to incite them to 
participate in the sustainable management of biodiversity. Here, we will present some 
initiatives that have been set up in the Congo Basin. 
5.4.1- Government initiatives  
Governments try to reward local communities for their participation in conservation by giving 
them back a certain percentage of profits derived from biodiversity. This is a way to recognize 
that local communities have been the main keepers of forests for long and also to incite them 
so that they can continue to act in sustainable resource management. In this perspective, some 
governments have introduced the transfer of a percentage (10 to 40 %) of the revenues from 
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tourism, mainly PA’s entrance fees, to local communities. This is a form of compensation for 
their efforts in conservation and it encourages them to participate in biodiversity conservation. 
They have been aware that if biodiversity is not successfully preserved in the PA, tourism will 
be reduced or stopped and they will not receive compensation anymore. Such transfers are 
effective in some PAs in Cameroon, CAR, DRC and it is planned to also introduce them in 
Congo and Gabon. Transfer of part of tourism revenues to local communities is actually done 
in 20% of the PAs investigated. The percentage transferred can range from 10 to 40%. In 
Dzanga-Ndoki national park in CAR, 40% of the funds from park entrance fees are paid in a 
local development fund for micro-projects.  
In some case, governments also compensate people displaced by the creation of a PA since 
they lose their actual livelihood and homes. This was tried for the creation of Korup National 
Park in Cameroon, but the government was not able to achieve relocation and communities 
are still located inside the park. Trying to establish people outside parks, governments can 
either pay out direct cash or provide new homes to these displaced families and communities. 
But they failed to achieve this compensation in many PAs in the Congo Basin and local 
people complain about it. It is suggested that instead of giving direct cash, it may be better to 
provide these displaced people with long-term income possibilities through training in better 
agricultural techniques or alternative crops (Butler, 2005). 
 
  5.4.2- Community Safari Hunting Zone 
Communities can get from the government the property rights over some forest areas and 
obtain the authorization to receive and manage revenues from wildlife use. In return, the 
populations must contribute to the sustainable wildlife management, surveillance and 
monitoring of wildlife resources in these areas. Such forest areas exist around one of the PAs 
investigated, the Nki National Park in Cameroon. They are called community hunting zones 
(ZICGC) and can reach 40.000 to 140.000 ha. Actually, 17 ZICGC exist in Cameroon and 
they aim to secure usage rights of local communities and to increase their participation in the 
management of wildlife resources in the periphery of PAs (Bigombe, 2003). They also 
substantially contribute to increase their access to the benefits of wildlife management and 
conservation. They constitute a safety belt designed to strengthen the conservation of 
biological resources in PAs. There is a joint-management contract duly signed between 
government and local communities. 
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Having property rights over the resources in the community-management hunting zones, local 
communities can undertake contractual arrangement with outsiders. The central contractual 
arrangement is between the COVAREF (the committee set aside for wildlife management that 
acts as the seller on behalf of its constituent communities) and one or more safari operators 
buying the service. Safari operators are buying from local community the rights to bring sport 
hunters or eco-tourists into their concession areas either to hunt a set quota of animals, or to 
track, observe and take pictures of animals, or simply to enjoy the scenic qualities of an area. 
Revenues obtained from the management are used for development projects and for 
conservation activities. 
The local communities around Benoue National Park in Cameroon use the revenues from the 
hunting zones as followed: 71% for development activities, 11% for operating charges of 
local wildlife committees, 8% for conservation (anti-poaching activities) and 10% for 
communication. Table 5 shows the use of the revenues from community-management hunting 
zones (ZICGC) in south-east Cameroon (WWF, 2004) 
Table 5: Utilization of revenues from ZICGC in south-east Cameroon 
Use of revenues Amount (FCFA)  Share (%)  
Operational charges 13 264 600  33.3  
Construction of offices  7 532 000  18.9 
Promotion of Education (Scholarships for students from 
bordering communities, construction and equipment of 
classrooms, donations of teaching materials to schools) 
 
5 743 000 
 
14.4 
Community agricultural plantations  3 314 950  8.3  
Motorcycles to improve monitoring of the area 2 636 000 6.6 
Anti-poaching activities and development of simple 
management plans 
2 494 250 6.3 
Water supply  2 068 200  5.2  
Habitat improvement  1 253 600  3.1  
Material support to Baka Pygmies 1 250 000  3.1  
Rural electrification  310 000  0.8  
TOTAL 39 866 600  100  
Source : WWF-Jengi ; State of ZICGC in South-East Cameroon, November 2004. 
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(1 euro = 655,957 FCFA) 
 
According to the interviewees, community-management hunting zones were conceived not 
only as a mean of promoting rural development but also of conserving wildlife and wildlife 
habitats. Their success with respect to biodiversity conservation can be evaluated either 
through the monitoring of wildlife numbers or the use of ecological indicators which could 
therefore be one measure of performance to estimate the additionality. To achieve this, there 
should be regular monitoring of wildlife in PAs surrounded by community-management 
hunting zones to determine wildlife number and distribution. Assessment of the area should 
also be done to see whether there is an increase in habitat loss for agriculture or other land 
uses. One indicator of success can be therefore an increase or at least a stability of wildlife in 
PAs and a decrease in habitat loss. 
 
  5.4.3- Ecotourism 
Tourism in PAs is known as ecotourism which is a mechanism that seeks to generate 
financing for forest conservation through selling visitation rights to biodiversity (Pagiola et 
al., 2002). Through it, livelihood of local communities can be improved for example by 
sharing benefits from ecotourism (e.g. PA’s entrance fees) with them as mentioned before. 
Ecotourism has started in Congo Basin a long time ago, but it is still a new approach in most 
PAs. Nowadays, it is effective in 45% of PAs investigated and focuses mostly on big games. 
In Kahuzi-Biega National Park in DRC, an UNESCO World Heritage, ecotourism has started 
since nearly 10 years with the impulsion of GTZ and UNESCO and it focuses mostly on plain 
Gorilla (Gorilla gorilla graueri). The ecotourism generates income for local people (10 – 
40% of the entrance fees) and employs them as guides, carriers and trackers. This is the 
classic scheme in almost all protected areas where ecotourism activities have been developed. 
The repartition key of revenues from ecotourism is normally decided by the government 
through the ministry in charge of PAs. But since there are not many tourists coming to visit 
PAs, there is not enough money to compensate local people. 
In Campo Ma’an, a different kind of ecotourism has been promoted by WWF which doesn’t 
focus on the park only but includes its surroundings (at the level of the TOU). Local 
associations have been created for the conservation of marine turtles. Based on their actions 
community-based ecotourism has been developed and is promoted along the coastline. Local 
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ecotourism groups receive from WWF capacity building in organizational aspects through 
training and exchange visits. One village receiving support of WWF in such ecotourism is 
Ebodjé, a village located along the Atlantic Ocean, about 50 kilometers from the town of 
Kribi. It is a fishing village with beautiful beaches where turtles come regularly to lay eggs 
from November to January. Ebodje was chosen as the site for the protection of marine turtles.  
WWF supports local associations for the establishment of basic community infrastructures to 
improve the capacity of villages for tourism. These local associations, who directly receive 
the revenues from ecotourism, work hard for biodiversity conservation in their area in order to 
attract more tourists. Hence, a part of revenues from ecotourism is used to fund biodiversity 
conservation activities while the other part is invested in development activities and salaries 
of people employed in conservation and ecotourism activities. There are also some profits 
from ecotourism like selling meals and other products to tourists, which go to individuals and 
not to the community as a whole.  
 
5.4.4- Community forestry 
Four countries (Cameroon, Gabon, DRC and CAR) have adopted laws allowing the practice 
of community forestry, with community forests established only in Cameroon. They are still 
in their pilot phase in Gabon, DRC, and CAR. A community forest is a forest covered by a 
management agreement between the village community and the forest administration. In the 
Congo Basin, community forestry does not give ownership rights to local communities on 
land. Ownership rights on land remain to the State and the local community property right is 
limited to exploitation and utilization of forest resources. But local communities have an 
exclusive property right on the use of forest products and they can use it to control the access 
to the resources. Exploiting forest resources for their development is an incentive for local 
communities to manage the forest sustainably since forest products belong to them. 
Community forestry is promoted in the surroundings of 10% of the PAs investigated. The 3 
PAs are Campo Ma’an National Park and Dja Biosphere Reserve in Cameroon; and Minkebe 
National Park in Gabon. The idea is to use community forests as a belt to protect biodiversity 
inside the PAs. Through community forestry, communities have property rights on forest 
resources and can exclude illegal users. Conservation contracts can then be signed between 
conservation organization and those communities.  
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It was tried as a conservation partnership in Kilum Ijim forest in the north-western part of 
Cameroon (Gardner et al., 2001). Following the failure of the Government, conservation 
communities represented by the NGO Birdlife International tried to achieve conservation of 
this valuable forest through community forestry. The total forest was shared in 18 community 
forests but a central conservation zone was kept as plant sanctuary. Birdlife International 
brings facilitation and support for the process of obtaining community forest. They also 
provide training in agriculture and livestock rearing since the main threat to the forest was 
identified to be the demand for new farmland. Conservation and monitoring activities are 
done by the local communities. But, three institutions participate in the conservation of the 
community forests: community-based management institutions, TOU (forest administration) 
and permanent ecological monitoring unit (conservation community seen as outside eye on 
the forest).  
Communities are willing to voluntarily give up for a low compensation the option of 
converting the forest to other land uses which may produce greater cash benefits. Birdlife 
International wants to establish a trust fund to provide resources needed for long-term 
ecological monitoring as well as limited strategic support to communities. This fund has a 
potential for direct payments for biodiversity conservation since it can be used if needed to 
pay compensation to local communities. 
 
5.5- Direct incentives for biodiversity conservation 
 
Some direct incentives for biodiversity conservation are actually implemented or in the sight 
to be implemented in the Congo Basin. They fall in area-based and use-restriction schemes of 
PES. 
  5.5.1- Area-based schemes 
5.5.1.1- Conservation Concessions 
No conservation concession is already implemented in the Congo Basin but there are 3 
conservation concession projects in the planning phase in Cameroon, DRC and CAR. (Table 
6) 
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Table 6: Proposed conservation concessions in the Congo Basin 
 Ngoila Mintom 
(Cameroon) 
Dzanga Sangha Dense 
Forest Special Reserve 
(CAR) 
Bonobo Conservation 
Concession (DRC) 
Area (ha) 546,814  237,000  681,000 
Beginning of negotiations  2002 2006 2008 
Organization soliciting the 
conservation concession 
CI andWWF WWF CI 
Parties involved in the 
contract 
CI and WWF 
Government 
Local communities 
Indigenous people 
WWF 
Government  
Local Communities 
CI 
Government 
Local communities 
Duration of the proposition / 
contract 
30 years (proposed 
before) 
10 years (Financial 
analysis) 
5 years (WWF 
proposition) 
25 years 
Types of payment proposed Revenues from timber 
activities minus 
intangible benefits from 
nature conservation 
Compensation to 
Government and local 
communities 
Management fees 
Trust fund for PA  
1-Fees to central 
government 
2-Contibution to local 
development fund 
3-Management fees 
Biodiversity to preserve 
(emblematic species) 
Elephant; Gorilla 
Chimpanzee 
Elephant 
Gorilla 
Bonobo 
Management and 
Monitoring  Institutions 
Conservation 
administration 
Local Pilot’s committee 
Scientific and technical 
committee 
n.a. Consortium of  
CI,  
BCI and  
local NGOs 
Estimated opportunity costs $ 18 per ha per year $ 72,952,924 
 
n.a. 
Estimated Implementation 
costs 
n.a. $ 325,825 per year to the 
government 
$ 4,872,543 for social 
investment and local 
people compensation 
$ 600,000 to 1,050,000 
per year 
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In Cameroon, the government set aside in 2002 an area of timber concessions between the 
Boumba-Bek and Dja Reserves (Figure 6), to be occupied by profitable conservation uses. CI 
was investigating the potential for a conservation concession in this context, with the basic 
idea of paying to the State a compensation as high as the revenues generated by the timber 
activities (tax revenues and profits) minus the intangible benefits derived from nature 
conservation (Karsenty and Lescuyer, 2001). But till now, the area has not yet been set as 
conservation concession.  
In 2006, wildlife and protected area administration proposed 2 scenarios of management of 
this large forest area. In the first scenario the entire area (932,142 ha) is set aside for 
conservation at a price of 1000 FCFA (1.5 euro) per ha, which is paid by international 
community. In the 2nd scenario the area is divided into zones and the WWF proposed in 2007 
to establish a TOU with only 546,814 ha area being set aside for biodiversity conservation in 
the central part. It is that area that can be purchased by conservation community as 
conservation area or Government can preserve for carbon credits in the REDD mechanism 
(Usongo et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MINEF, 2001 
Figure 6: Location of Ngoila-Mintom forest, proposed conservation concession in Cameroon 
 
In 2006 the WWF proposed to the government of CAR the establishment of a conservation 
concession in 237,000 ha of forest formally used as logging concession (Figure 7). But this 
proposition was rejected by the central government. Following the social conflicts led by 
formal utilization of that forest, and the proximity of this concession to Dzanga-Sangha PAs 
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conservationists suggest again its conversion into conservation concession. The objective is to 
reduce human pressure on the nature and promote ecotourism and carbon sequestration. 
Leasing taxes of the conservation concession is assumed to be paid by conservation actors. In 
an attempt to evaluate opportunity costs of conservation in that area, Lescuyer (2008) did a 
financial analysis of 3 management scenarios of this forest area. The study showed that over a 
10-year period and at discount rate of 10%, conservation concession brings 68% less revenues 
than logging concession. To make conservation concession attractive to the government, 
conservation actors should pay to the Government a compensation for the opportunity costs 
which can be equal to forgone benefits minus benefits derived from nature conservation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                         Source: PARPAF, 2004 
Figure 7: Location of the proposed conservation concession in CAR 
 
In DRC, the NGO Conservation International proposed to the government the creation of a 
681,000 ha conservation concession (Figure 8). CI and its partner BCI made a proposal for 
conserving this concession in exchange of annual payments under a 25-year contract with the 
National Government and local communities. Through this contract, CI will pay to the 
government annual fees to preserve the forest equal to timber concession tax revenues and 
profits. CI will also contribute to a local development fund in order to provide social and 
economic benefits to local communities having customary rights over the concession area (CI 
and BCI, 2008). This proposal was presented to the government and discussed with other 
conservation actors at the Workshop on alternative models for sustainable management of 
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DRC forests held in Kinshasa in June 2008. But the project is still at the discussion and 
planning phase and it is not yet implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: CI and BCI, 2008 
Figure 8: Proposed location of the Bonobo Conservation concession in DRC 
 
5.5.1.2- Plot set aside for carbon sequestration evaluation 
In the surroundings of Salonga National Park in DRC, the WWF signed a contract with a 
community to set aside 10 ha of forest as a permanent plot for carbon evaluation. The deal is 
that the village should preserve this part of forest as a no man’s land. All activities 
(agriculture, hunting, collection of NTFP) are forbidden inside that plot. The contract has 
been signed for a 10 years period but the payments are made annually to ensure that the 
conservation service will be provided through out the contract period. Deals are signed 
between WWF and the community represented by the chief of the village who is considered 
to be the plot guard. The local community asked for compensation in the form of agricultural 
equipment, livestock and staples. The compensation is received by the chief in cash and in 
kind and the WWF does not evaluate how the compensation is distributed among the 
community members. Monitoring is done by the WWF through sporadic visits of the forest 
area. This project is still in the very beginning and it is difficult to evaluate it now. But the 
contract is respected until now by all parties and the government is not involved.  
 
 
  
46
5.5.2- Use-restriction schemes 
5.5.2.1- Community marine turtles’ conservation  
Two approaches have been used to compensate local communities for the conservation of 
marine turtles in the surroundings of Campo Ma’an National Park in Cameroon. It is 
important to notice that marine turtles are fully protected in Cameroon since a ministerial 
decree in 1991.  
The first approach is a direct payment to fishermen who catch marine turtles during their 
fishing activities and release them right after. A system of patronage has been put in place, 
consisting of payments for releasing turtles caught by fishermen. This payment is a 
compensation for fisherman whose net was damaged by the marine turtle caught. This 
strategy has proven to be effective in protecting marine turtles (Gilles Etoga, personal 
communication). There is not a contract signed, it is based on a voluntary participation of 
fishermen. This compensation is funded by the visiting tourists who pay sometimes up to 
10,000 FCFA (15 euro) to the fishermen to release a sea turtle back to the sea. It thus can be 
unsustainable if there are no tourists coming anymore or if they are not willing to pay for it. It 
then appears important to develop a special fund from different actors. The compensation so 
far does not go to the entire community but to individuals. It is hence important to develop 
strategies to generate sufficient stimulus at the community level that would benefit protection 
of this species.  
A second approach is the support to local organizations working for conservation of marine 
turtles. The WWF, through its Kudu Zombo project, has been involving local communities in 
the conservation and monitoring of marine turtles through capacity building and the transfer 
of management responsibilities to local people. In this perspective, two local associations for 
the conservation of marine turtles have been created in Ebodjé village. These associations 
carry out activities to save turtles and ensure their conservation. They raise awareness and 
undertake environmental education activities. They collect turtle eggs and bring them to 
hatcheries located near the Ebodjé beaches to guaranty the healthy development of the 
embryos. They are also involved in the monitoring of sea turtles nesting which is carried out 
through regular night patrols to identify nesting population dynamics over time (variation in 
the number of nesting females). They work in cleaning and maintenance of beaches and are 
responsible for the identification and the release of marine turtles caught by fishermen. To 
realize all these activities, they organize themselves in working groups getting financial 
  
47
support of the WWF. These actions of local communities in marine turtle conservation have 
been rewarded by the WWF through realization of some social projects like supporting 
schools and the construction of social infrastructure. The expected result is an increase in 
marine turtle population. 
 
5.5.2.2- Compensation for damage caused y wildlife 
Another form of payment for biodiversity conservation is to compensate local communities 
living within or near protected areas for damages caused by wildlife in their agricultural lands. 
This is a provision of wildlife and forest law of all the Congo Basin countries but it is rarely 
practiced. Indeed in the surroundings of PAs, wildlife is pest for agriculture or causes 
injurious to humans. Payments in compensation for damage is then required (e.g., predator 
compensation funds of Defenders of Wildlife and the WWF) for local people for costs borne 
by not killing wildlife. This form of compensation was found to be used as incentive for 
biodiversity conservation in one of the investigated PAs, Monte Alen National Park in 
Equatorial Guinea. When local communities forego to kill protected wildlife which can be 
harmful for their crops and their lives, they are taking part in conservation. They should then 
be compensated by the administration in charge of the PA. To encourage farmers to protect 
the wildlife, the level of compensation should be higher than the actual damage since meat is 
another benefit from hunting. 
 
5.5.2.3- Rewards for denunciation of poachers  
A different mechanism to reward local communities for their efforts in conservation was 
observed in 2 of the PAs investigated, namely in Dzanga-Sangha and in Garamba National 
Parks in CAR and DRC respectively. In those PAs, conservation organizations decided to 
reward local people who denunciate and help to arrest poachers. The objective here is to solve 
poaching which is done for market purpose. Hence, when a villager denunciates a poacher to 
the conservation organization or to forest guards, he receives in return a compensation in kind 
(for example bicycles in Garamba) or in cash, when the poacher is arrested. The 
compensation is financed by the conservation organizations and the forest administration. It 
helps to incite local people to act as watchmen for the forest, assisting the forest guards in 
their function and participating in wildlife conservation.  
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  5.5.3- Obstacles to implementation of direct payments for biodiversity 
Interviewees raised some obstacles that can hinder the implementation of direct payments for 
biodiversity. They mentioned the followings obstacles: 
- In most communities around forests, individualism is so developed that there is a lack 
of confidence among villagers. Hence, it is difficult for the community to join their 
efforts in conservation or to share payments received for conservation. Sometimes 
communities are not well organized and they do not have capacity to manage and 
control the resources. 
- Communities are poor and they do not have the funds for implementing conservation 
contracts. Furthermore, the determination of opportunity costs is not an easy task. 
There is also the risk that communities because of their cupidity ask for high 
compensations that cannot be paid by conservation organization. 
- National regulations concerning PES are missing. 
- Trans-boundary cooperation between communities and governments is not good 
enough to ensure that outsiders will not threaten biodiversity preserved by neighbors. 
There is also a great difficulty to control the access of outsiders to the forests. 
- A bad distribution of compensation among community members may lead to conflicts 
and the funds received might be invested by some members in harmful activities. The 
communities may lack the capacity to manage development funds. 
- Administrative procedures are sometimes very slow and difficult to follow in the 
Congo Basin. Hence elites can finance the process for their own interest. 
- Compensation funds are expected only from the international community which may 
make the payment unsustainable. 
- Land use rights are not secured in most cases and can restraint the process. 
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VI Discussion and Conclusions: Possibility of implementing PES in the 
Congo Basin 
 
6.1- Conditions for the success of payments for biodiversity conservation 
mechanisms in the Congo Basin context 
Selling environmental services is not mentioned in forest laws of any country in the Congo 
Basin. It is a new concept and as mentioned in the previous chapter, there are some attempts 
to implement this mechanism but still at the conceptual phase. Questions like who, what and 
how to pay; what can be the costs of implementing it; how to ensure monitoring need to be 
considered carefully. The success of implementing direct payments for biodiversity 
conservation in the Congo Basin will depend on several issues. We will discuss some of them 
in this section.  
 
6.1.1- Property rights 
In the Congo Basin forests, land users do not have formal land titles. This can hinder direct 
payments for biodiversity conservation. The solution in Costa Rica was to create parallel 
contracts using private funds for landowners without titles. Hence, the absence of land titles 
does not mean that land users are excluded from PES schemes, since the main concern for 
private ES buyers is not de-jure land titles, but de-facto land and resource use control rights 
(Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). This means that land proprietors whose land claims 
are widely recognized and respected will be the efficient providers of conservation services, 
as long as they control access to the resources being protected. On the other hand, landowners 
with de-jure land titles but no de-facto control over their properties would not be qualified. 
Hence, what will be decisive among tenure rights for the efficiency of payments for 
biodiversity conservation is the “right to exclude” other people (Wunder, 2005). Nevertheless, 
de-jure and de-facto resource use rights are combined in community forestry giving a great 
advantage for PES.  
An essential and initial step in implementing contracts for biodiversity conservation in the 
Congo Basin will be the recognition of property rights since the key task is to ensure that 
those providing conservation service have clear and enforceable rights to the benefits of their 
efforts. Without strong institutions to enforce rights, conservation contracts will contribute 
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little to biodiversity protection. However, allocating property rights can be an expensive and 
conflict-ridden process that will involve high transaction costs. How to solve then the problem 
of absence of property rights for local people? 
Following the weak property rights observed in Africa, Le Roy (1996) presented a land 
control theory. He associated common law and traditional rights and showed that there exist 
in reality 25 ways of land and resources control in the African context (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Possible regulations of relations between man and land through land control (Le Roy, 
1996) 
Appropriation 
modes 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-manage-
ment mode 
Undifferentiated 
Control 
 
(Access rights) 
Priority 
Control 
 
(Access and 
substraction 
rights) 
Specialized 
Control 
 
(Access, 
substraction 
and 
management 
rights) 
Exclusive 
Control 
 
(Access, 
substraction, 
management 
and exclusion 
rights) 
Absolute 
exclusive 
Control 
(Access, 
substraction, 
management, 
exclusion and 
alienation rights) 
Public 
(common to all) 
Undifferentiated and 
public control 
Priority and 
public control 
Specialized and 
public control 
Exclusive and 
public control 
Absolute exclusive 
and public control 
External 
(common to n 
groups) 
Undifferentiated and 
external control 
Priority and 
external control 
Specialized and 
external control 
Exclusive and 
external control 
Absolute exclusive 
and external control 
Internal-
External 
(Common to 2 
groups) 
Undifferentiated and 
internal-external 
control 
Priority and 
internal-external 
control 
Specialized and 
internal-external 
control 
Exclusive and 
internal-external 
control 
Absolute exclusive 
and internal-external 
control 
Internal 
(Common to one 
group) 
Undifferentiated and 
internal control 
Priority and 
internal control 
Specialized and 
internal control 
Collective 
property rights 
Absolute exclusive 
and internal control 
Private (own to 
a person) 
Undifferentiated and 
private control 
Priority and 
private control 
Specialised and 
private control 
Individual 
property rights 
Owner 
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Table 7 shows 25 different land and resource control modes deriving from a combination of 
land appropriation and co-management modes. The land or resource appropriation modes 
determine the type of rights that the users have on the resources. They range from 
undifferentiated control with only the access rights to absolute exclusive control giving to the 
users the right to sell the resources. Co-management modes determine to whom the resources 
belong. They can belong to everybody (public goods), to one or many groups or to an 
individual (private goods). The modes that are highlighted in grey are those that are necessary 
for establishment of PES. 
In the absence of ownership, the type of land control needed for conservation contracts are 
“exclusive and internal” control rights if contracts are to be signed with a community or a 
lineage. If they will be signed with families (since land mostly belongs not to individuals but 
to a family according to traditional law), “exclusive and private” control rights are required. 
This means that to sign a conservation contract with a community one should look carefully 
that co-management is ensured by the community who has the rights to enter the forest, to 
use/harvest resources, to manage it, to regulate internal patterns of use or transform the 
resource through improvements or negligence, and to decide who shall have rights of access 
and how these rights can be obtained, lost or transferred. For a conservation contract with 
families, they should have, in addition to the previous rights, a private co-management right. 
It is important to make a micro zoning of the forest to guarantee the respect of contract deals. 
According to traditional/customary law, agricultural fields and forest fallows belong to 
families and for those lands, it is better to make contracts with families since they can better 
control the access. But forest resources that are a little bit far belong to the whole village. 
Indeed, what predominates in forests surrounding villages is a collective property for a whole 
village community. It had been shown that a large part of forest area is made up of 
identifiable village lands that can be easily delimited by villagers (Karsenty et al., 1997). It is 
difficult or even impossible to share these village lands between families and an easy option 
will be to make contracts with the village community since it will involve less transaction 
costs. But it will require community homogeneity which, in reality, is a myth. Even in 
traditional societies, at least some members of the community are actively seeking to increase 
their status through alternative exploitative land uses (Garnett et al., 2007). So, this can be an 
obstacle for conservation contracts with communities since it will be difficult to convince all 
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the members of the community to respect contract deals. Hence the question of community’s 
ability to self-enforce rights and contract deals remains, despite the fact that it has exclusive 
rights to prevent illegal users to access its forest. 
Contract deals can be better enforced at family level since less people are to be controlled, but 
implementing contracts with families will involve more transaction costs in terms of time and 
money. A way to reduce these transaction costs, can be to shift to public schemes of PES 
where the State acts on behalf of ES buyers by collecting grants and paying alleged ES 
providers as it has been the case in Costa Rica, Mexico and China. But involving the 
Government could not necessary reduce transaction costs since it will also involve heavy 
information and coordination costs. Moreover, government regulation and decree enforcement 
are weak in the Congo Basin, which will reduce the efficiency of payments. 
For the success of conservation contracts with communities, the property rights recognized by 
customary law should be secured by institutional arrangements. Delimitation and mapping in 
the presence of all the stakeholders are the first steps in the identification of individuals or 
groups to whom the property rights are allocated. Following it, conservation contracts will be 
made with those groups having property rights. Governments can improve the allocation of 
property rights for example through community forestry, by giving legal land titles to land 
holders or by legitimizing customary rights. Having the property rights on community forests, 
local people can decide to set them aside as conservation concession to get compensation. 
Conservation contracts will eliminate the open-access character of ecosystems (which is a 
driver of illegal use of resources) by allocating land to local residents. 
As conclusion, for the success of direct payment for biodiversity conservation, property rights 
need to be established and enforced. This can be done through mapping to identify property 
rights. But the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights may be prohibitive. 
Independently on property rights, use-restriction PES scheme can be implemented to protect 
some biodiversity elements like large games and endangered species.  
 
6.1.2- Opportunity costs and amount of compensation 
To produce biodiversity conservation services, local people bear opportunity costs in terms of 
the benefits forgone from for example agricultural and livestock production, small scale 
logging, or hunting. Opportunity costs should be carefully evaluated through estimating the 
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value of forested land use alternative and this may involve high transaction costs (Ninan et al., 
2007). Opinions are shared about whether the compensation should be lower or equal to these 
opportunity costs. Compensations can be lower than the opportunity cost because people can 
use the time formally spent in their “destructive” activities for other income generating 
activities, since paying for conservation means somehow paying them for doing nothing. This 
can work where forest is poor and people do not expect high benefits from it. Establishing a 
PES scheme in those areas are not efficient since there may be no additionnality. In general, 
this will rarely work in the Congo Basin since forest people are highly dependent on the forest 
and will hardly find alternative non-destructive activities as a source of income. Also they 
want to win from the situation and will expect compensation to be at least as high as their 
forgone benefits, no matter what they will do with the saved time. Moreover, if contracts are 
based on use-restriction for wildlife, it appears that small scale hunting should be stopped 
leading to more benefit lost. For forest people, hunting is often done as habits or way of living 
and not necessarily for income; so incentives should be high to change these habits and create 
other spare-time activities. Furthermore, there are also external costs of conservation, for 
example the wildlife damage costs and the expenditures to protect against wildlife attacks as 
mentioned in the results section. Considering all this, the possible trend in the Congo Basin 
will be to pay compensations at least as high as the opportunity costs. This is because the land 
user will typically reject payments for conservation offers if forest conservation is not 
sufficiently economically attractive, compared to the highly profitable land-use alternatives 
such as logging, mining, oil palms, soybeans, or perennial crops. 
Conservation’s opportunity costs are returns to alternative land uses and are subject to future 
changes (Wunder, 2005). This means that opportunity costs estimated at the beginning may 
not remain the same throughout the duration of long-term contracts. They can change over 
time based on demographic trend or land requested by external users. One cause of failure of 
ICDPs in the Congo Basin was the deficiency to consider population change as one of the 
slow changing variables that can drive the dynamics of a system once a threshold has been 
passed. In many ICDPs and subsequent case study analyses, there was an underlying 
assumption that the number of people in the landscape is relatively static, which is often not 
true (Garnett et al, 2007). If there is an increase in population, more land will be needed for 
agriculture meaning the opportunity costs for choosing conservation will be higher. Also, 
firms can be willing to purchase land at high prices for agricultural production of, for 
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example, biofuels. The value of alternative uses of land will then increase leading to higher 
opportunity costs. Another issue is that people seek to improve their living conditions. The 
compensation level that can be enough for them today may not be sufficient in the future. If 
they are not anymore satisfied by the compensation they might return to their “destructive” 
activities. Furthermore the economy in the Congo Basin countries is not stable and if it 
stagnates, it will induce high dependency on land leading to an increase in opportunity costs. 
This raises the need to “revaluate” compensation levels and update contracts throughout their 
life. This will of course involve high transaction costs that should not be ignored in budgeting 
payments for biodiversity conservation mechanisms. All this should be taken into account to 
prevent failure of payments and it is necessary to foresee them in the contracts so that they 
can be re-negotiated at any time according to changing in opportunity costs. 
 
6.1.3- Payment schemes 
As mentioned before, biodiversity conservation in the Congo Basin has been mostly focused 
on preserving some elements of biodiversity especially big wildlife and endangered species. 
Biodiversity friendly practices in the proximity to PAs might be more valuable by helping to 
buffer and protect them. That is the area par excellence where to focus conservation contracts 
with communities in order to improve conservation in PAs. Two different approaches for 
wildlife conservation can be used in the Congo Basin: area-based and use-restriction schemes.  
Area-based approaches target the conservation of biodiversity directly by paying local land 
users. This will restrict their access to land for agricultural and livestock production and can 
evolve into community PAs. It also works for conservation concessions proposed by CI, 
which compensates both, government and local communities, for the forgone benefits. For 
this approach, there should be a baseline to evaluate efforts in preventing deforestation. The 
baseline can be for example the absence of new deforested lands. This will only work if 
agricultural practices are changed and agricultural lands are settled through intensification of 
sustainable agriculture for example. Another baseline can be the reduction in deforested area 
assuming that more land for agriculture will be needed by local people in the future. In this 
way two types of baselines have been proposed for the future REDD mechanism, namely 
historical reference and reference with an adjustment factor (Karsenty, 2008). The second one 
is the one proposed by COMIFAC for the Congo Basin. Area-based approaches require long-
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term payments involving high transaction costs. Payments should be done only if no more or 
less forest areas have been destroyed. But, it is difficult to prevent local people to access 
forest land and resources since they heavily depend on it for their livelihood activities 
(Gockowski et al., 2004). Trying to do so will involve high opportunity costs. It will then be 
difficult or even impossible to establish no man’s land for biodiversity conservation outside 
PAs.  
What appears then to be a more feasible option are use-restrictions, which preserve only some 
components of the biodiversity. This means that efforts will be done for species protection. 
Following this approach, indicators are needed to evaluate the production of biodiversity 
conservation services. An indicator, for example, can be wildlife population. At the beginning 
of the contract period there should be an inventory to determine the level of wildlife 
populations in the forest. A new inventory, which involves high but necessary transaction 
costs, should be planned at the end of each payment period. Payments should be done only if 
there is an increase or at least stability in the wildlife population. If not, the buyers of the 
service can decide to stop the payments. But it can happen that the indicator decreases 
because of some causes that cannot be attributed to the local community, for example diseases 
or natural hazards. It will be then necessary to investigate through field surveys whether the 
local community is responsible for this situation or not. This can be an expensive solution that 
will involve again high transaction costs in the pursuit of efficiency. This raises the necessity 
to associate also community efforts in conservation as indicators and not only the results, but 
efforts are difficult to evaluate. It means that conservation efforts should be paid on a case-by-
case basis together with the results (wildlife population). Community efforts in conservation 
can be for example, denunciation or catching of poachers, wildlife habitat management and 
improvement (see maintenance of wildlife corridor in Kenya under PES or marine turtle 
conservation initiatives in Campo Ma’an), forest guarding and preventing the access of 
poachers.  
The fact that people are unable to arrive at a universally accepted measure of biodiversity 
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002) has a critical implication in the feasibility of market based 
approaches for biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity can then be sold in bundled 
environmental services. This is the case in conservation concessions where both biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration services are produced and can be sold as a bundle of 
services. This might be implemented in the near future in the Congo Basin since the REDD 
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mechanism is actively discussed nowadays (Laporte et al., 2007). The idea here will be to use 
REDD funds to support conservation. 
 
6.1.4- Form and use of compensation funds 
The collective property of forests around village raises the question of how to pay 
compensation to communities. Two situations are possible: either the communities distribute 
it among their members or the use of a development fund for development projects for the 
whole community. However, compensation can also be paid in kind instead of in cash. 
The main problem in distributing money among villagers is that it can generate conflict as it 
was observed in south-east Cameroon with timber royalties, because of difficulties to share 
the money among community families. Furthermore, cash payments can exacerbate residents’ 
exposure to risk by making them more dependent on markets for meeting their consumption 
needs. In rural areas, markets are often imperfect, and residents may not be able to transform 
cash into the resources they need or the prices are higher than anticipated (Ferraro, 2001). 
Sometimes, rural people have limited access to food markets because they are non-existent in 
their area or are far from their villages. They have then to travel to proximate small cities to 
have access to markets for the resources they need. Hence, payments may not prevent them 
from using the forest resources they agreed to conserve. To solve such a problem around 
logging concessions, timber companies in South-East Cameroon are trying to combat 
poaching by developing markets for beef and fish. But this appeared to be highly expensive. 
Nevertheless, such an initiative can also be adopted in the context of payments for 
biodiversity conservation to increase their efficiency. Market for agricultural products, meat 
and fish can be developed nearby the communities receiving money from conservation 
contracts. But this will increase the transaction costs. 
Direct-payment initiatives do not require households to stop agriculture or to make significant 
labor investments. Hence they can continue and improve production on previously cleared 
lands, work off-farm or do stock farming in enclosures to diversify their food sources. 
Conservation payments can thus be viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for 
current income. But, the beneficiaries may not be willing to invest their time and money 
received in environmental-friendly activities that can increase food availability. 
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Another possibility is to establish a local development fund which uses the payments for 
socio-economic projects. But this should be carefully discussed with the community members 
since it may not meet people desire. The payments belong to the whole community because of 
the collective property and hence it is necessary that community members agree on how the 
money will be used. Since the communities are not homogeneous this might rarely be possible 
(Garnett et al., 2007). This highlights again the problem of the collective property of forests in 
conservation contracts, in opposite to private property that made easy the implementation of 
such mechanism in Costa Rica (Ferraro, 2001). Nevertheless there should be a real 
appropriation of compensation funds management by local people so that they feel that they 
are really benefiting from the production of environmental services. Hence, local people may 
need the assistance of an NGO or an external actor to help them through a democratic process 
to come out with how they want to use the money. This can be expensive since past conflicts 
should be solved before continuing the process. Indeed, negotiations might then reveal 
prohibitively high transaction costs (money and time wise) also associated with structuring 
the PES deals (Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). 
Payments through a local development fund also face the problem of fund embezzlement 
which is common in decentralized forest management. According to Oyono et al. (2007) it is 
necessary to use legal proceedings and punishments to solve this problem of corruption and 
fund embezzlement in redistribution and utilization of forest revenues.  
To achieve this, there is the need of an authority acknowledged by all the stakeholders which 
ensures the compliance with the legal framework. This authority should be able to respect and 
enforce contracts even by force when necessary. It should have the right to take legal proceedings 
against illegal users and defalcators. So it must be legitimate and/or legal as far as possible and 
should not be corruptible by any illegal user of the forest. Such an institution will be respected by 
all the stakeholders only if it is established through a democratic and legitimate process as 
mentioned by Nguinguiri (2003) for the case of PA committees. Democratization appears then to 
be a key issue in the management of compensation funds for the success of conservation 
contracts. In some cases, however, the absolute authority of a traditional leader was able to ensure 
successful conservation. This was the case in Kilum/Ijim (Cameroon), where the relative 
success of the conservation program was the result of the absolute authority of the local 
traditional leader, the Fon. Such systems can be more stable in African context than 
democratization, although Gartlan (2004) found them to be rarely stable for long. 
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Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that the democratization of decision making can 
benefit natural resource quality and also reduce corruption, which is increasingly seen as a 
threat to conservation (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Smith and Walpole, 2005). 
 
6.1.5- Monitoring 
The objective of conservation contracts is to bring local people to forgo hunting and other 
biodiversity harmful activities in areas established for conservation. Conservation contracts 
require periodic payments and monitoring over time as mentioned in the previous sections. It 
then requires long-term investments in contrast to development-based interventions that often 
require short-term investments. It has been shown that conservation initiatives based on 
simplistic ideas of making limited short-term investments in local development did achieve 
neither sustainable resource use nor reduced pressure on parks (Wells et al., 1999). But, 
despite its imposing institutional needs, a system of direct payments has many of the same 
institutional requirements as development-based interventions with an emphasis on 
monitoring biodiversity (Brown and Wyckoff-Baird, 1992; Wells et al., 1999). Existing local 
committees can be an asset in monitoring conservation contracts. But what guarantees that 
they will effectively monitor compliance with the terms of conservation? We raised already 
the question of the ability of local structures to enforce management norms. This introduces 
again the need of an external monitoring system with sequential audits, which involves high 
transaction costs. 
Can the monitoring of conservation contracts be done by the governments? The monitoring 
system ensured by the governmental administration in most of the PAs in the Congo basin 
does not function well and some are just PAs by name nowadays. This shows that 
governments might be unable to monitor conservation contracts, unless they establish first a 
functioning monitoring system for the existing PAs. 
In most of the communities living in and around Congo Basin forests, law enforcement, both 
traditional and formal, is weak. Conservation contracting may be impossible if good 
institutional structures and property rights are not set up. Setting them up will improve 
efficiency while increasing transaction costs.  
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6.1.6- Sustainability of funding 
The success of conservation contracts will depend also on the sustainability of payments over 
time. Because of the conditionality of PES, payments will continue only if ES provider 
secures ES provision (Wunder, 2005). Hence, direct payments may not be a sustainable 
conservation program because of weakness of laws and regulations. So, there is a risk of 
misusing funds. Apart from direct payments, other possible financing mechanisms that can be 
used in the Congo Basin are Trust Fund for management of PAs or REDD mechanism. 
Trust fund for PA management is an international fund whose revenue generated by investing 
the capital on international markets would allow long-term funding of conservation inside 
PAs. It is a potential direct financing mechanism that can be used for implementing direct 
payments for biodiversity conservation around PAs. A Trust Fund already exists in Sangha 
Tri-National foundation, a network of PAs integrating Cameroon, Congo and CAR. Another 
one is now proposed in DRC (Carr-Dirick, 2008). It will be good if a part of funds available 
can be invested in conservation contracts to improve conservation in PAs.  
REDD mechanism can also be a future indirect financing mechanism for conservation 
contracts. REDD concerns only carbon sequestrated by the reduction of deforestation and 
forest degradation; but it is clear that while reducing deforestation, biodiversity conservation 
services are also produced in most cases. Furthermore, conservation contracts with 
communities can be used as a mean to achieve reduction in deforestation. Hence part of the 
money received from selling credit carbon can be used to finance payments under 
conservation contracts (compare REDD projects implemented by WWF in the region).  
 
6.2- Synthesis on obstacles 
 
In general biodiversity faces the particular challenge that, in spite of its general appreciation, 
willingness to pay directly for its conservation has remained quite limited (Wunder and 
Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). Poverty, poor governance and political instability are significant 
limiting factors in achieving biodiversity conservation (USAID, 2004). Governance was 
mentioned by the interviewees as a great obstacle to the implementation of payments for 
biodiversity conservation. 
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All obstacles presented by the interviewees can be overcome but this involves high 
transaction costs that are sometimes not taken into account by authors presenting PES as a 
cheap mechanism to achieve biodiversity conservation (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Hardner 
and Rice, 2002; Saunders and Nussbaum, 2007). Potential transaction costs include the costs 
of improved access to information (provision of reliable information on biophysical complex 
and economic processes), the costs of defining property rights, the costs of drawing up legal 
contracts for the provision of biodiversity conservation service and investing in legal and 
institutional capacity (ITTO, 2004). In Costa Rica, substantial transaction costs were involved 
including administrative costs, costs imposed to participants through the need to prepare 
management plan, and costs for “bundling” small landowners for joint-management plan 
(Pagiola, 2002). There may be more costs, since the establishment of PES schemes normally 
requires a full economic valuation of all ecosystem services (as the buyers’ benefits) and a 
detailed financial analysis of all alternative land-use options (as the providers’ opportunity 
costs) (Wunder and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). 
 
The high amount of compensation required in the Congo Basin may also be an obstacle to 
find ES buyers in the process of implementing conservation contracts, since conservationists 
prefer areas with low opportunity costs (Engel and Palmer, 2008). An estimation of the 
compensations needed for Ngoila-Mintom conservation concession indicated that they are 
very high compared to the conservation concessions already realized in other parts of the 
world. It is estimated to be US$ 18 per hectare per year, which is far more than the US$ 1.25 
per hectare per year needed in Guyana (Karsenty, 2007). Based on this, we can conclude that 
payments for biodiversity conservation may be far more expensive in the Congo Basin than 
what is been imagined unless remote and low populated areas are selected. But this will 
question the principle of additionnality requested for PES mechanisms. 
 
Another big obstacle might be the behavior of external and internal elites. Since the costs of 
implementing conservation contracts with communities may be so high that communities 
cannot afford them, there is a risk that elites seize the compensation. Their strategy will be to 
invest money in the implementation of contracts and later consider payments as revenue from 
their business. This was observed in Cameroon with the establishment of council and 
community forests; and community hunting zones (Ngoumou, 2005). There elites were very 
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active and willing to finance the long and expensive process of acquisition of forests. What 
happen later is that more than half of the revenue where used as administrative expenses and 
shared between the businessmen (elites); and less amount where spent in socio-economic 
infrastructure benefiting to the whole community (Bigombé, 2007). If this happens in the case 
of conservation contracts, it will reduce their efficiency since local people will not feel 
engaged by the contract anymore and will return to destructive activities. Hence payment 
under PES will be stopped since they are linked to conservation efforts. Conservationists 
should then make sure that elites do not invest money in contract establishment and they 
should bear themselves implementation costs. This will lead again to high transaction costs 
but is essential for the efficiency of conservation contracts.  
 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations can be made to facilitate implementation of conservation 
contracts: 
- Property rights: it is important to recognize and legalize customary property rights 
which appear to be the best institutional framework through which access to resources 
can be controlled. Community forestry can be an actual solution to the problem of 
property rights since through it, local people have secured rights over forest resources; 
- Opportunity costs: it is important to carefully evaluated benefits forgone by doing 
conservation, which can be far more than just agricultural revenues. It should take into 
account the evolution of rural economies and the improvement of living standard; 
- Type of payment schemes: direct incentives for biodiversity conservation observed in 
the Congo Basin are mainly use-restriction schemes. This may be the appropriate 
scheme, where contracts can be done to restrict use rights to some species that we 
want to preserve. Area-based scheme may not be appropriate since local people 
heavily depend on land for agriculture. But land deforested for agriculture should be 
controlled since forests are wildlife habitat and focus should be put on reducing new 
deforested land for agriculture. This can be done through intensification of sustainable 
agriculture on actual farmlands to increase farmer income; 
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- Local institution: the local institution which will represent the community in the deal 
and manage funds received from payments should be acknowledged by all 
stakeholders. It should be legitimate, legal and able to enforce contracts. Capacity of 
existing local institutions should be increased to make them credible and competent to 
enter into contracts; 
- Monitoring: because of weakness of communities in law enforcement, there is a need 
of an external monitoring system for conservation contracts;  
- Conservation contract funds and REDD mechanism: there might be synergies between 
REDD and conservation schemes if not only governments receive such payments. 
Since the terms of the payment mechanisms under REDD are not yet established, it 
may be possible to think of REDD projects for biodiversity conservation. In this way, 
REDD might finance conservation contracts. Trust fund for PA management might 
also provide funds to implement such contracts in the surroundings of PAs.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Complete list of protected areas in the Congo Basin countries 
Protected areas Area (ha)  Date of creation IUCN_Categories 
Cameroon (25)      
1- Dja Biosphere Reserve  526,000 26. Apr 1950 IV 
2- Lobeké National Park  217,854 19. March 2001 II 
3- Campo-Ma’an National Park 264,064 19 november 1932 Campo/10 octobre 
1980 Campo-Ma’an II 
4- Mbam et Djerem National Park 125,000 colonial period Pangar et Djerem/ 
1982 Mbam et Djerem Fauna Reserve 
and 2000 , changed into national park  
II 
5- Korup National Park 125,900 1937 / National Park in 1986 II 
6- Bénoué National Park 180,000 11th november 1932/ became National 
Park on 5th december 1968 II 
7- Waza National Park 170,000 1934/ National Park in 1968 II 
8- Faro National Park 330,000 1980 II 
9- Bouba Ndjida National Park 220,000 1968 II 
10- Kalamaloué National Park 4,500 1968 II 
11- Vallée du Mbéré National Park 77,760 2004   
12- Mozo Gokoro National Park 1,400 1968 II 
13- Mpem et Djim National Park 100,000 2004   
14- Douala-Edéa Reserve 160,000 1932 IV 
15- Kimbi Wildlife Reserve 5,625 1964 IV 
16- Santchou Wildlife Reserve 7,000 1964 IV 
17- Mbi Crater Wildlife Reserve 370 1964   
18-Ossa Lake Wildlife Reserve 4,000 1968 IV 
19- Banyang Mbo Sanctuary 66,000 1996 VI 
20- Yaoundé Zoological Garden 2.07 1951   
21- Limbé Zoological Garden 0.5 1963   
22- Garoua Zoological Garden 1.5 1966   
23-Boumba Bek  National Park 238,255 En création II 
24- Nki National Park 309,362 En création II 
25- Mefou National Park 1,044 En création   
Congo (14)      
1- Odzala-Kokoua National Park 1,354,600 1935 / 2003 (extension) II 
2- Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park 386.592 1993 / 2003 (extension) II 
3- Télé Lake Community Reserve 438,960 10th may 2001 IV 
4- Conkouati Douli National Park 504,950 1980 (Reserve)/1999 (National Park) II 
5- Léféni Wildlife Reserve 630,000 1955 IV 
6- Mont Fouari Reserve 15,600 1958 IV 
7- Dimonika Wildlife Reserve 136,000 1988   
8- Tsoulou Wildlife Reserve 30,000 1963 IV 
9- Mont Mavoungou Hunting Zone 42,000 1958 VI 
10- Nyanga nord Hunting Zone 7,700 1958 IV 
11- Nyanga sud Hunting Zone 23,000 1958 VI 
12- Lossi Sanctuary 35,000 2001   
13-Sanctuaire de Lessio -Louna 44.000 31. Dez 99   
14-Sanctuaire de Tchimpounga 7.000 31. Dez 99   
Gabon (13)      
1- Lopé National Park 491,291 2002 II 
2- Minkébé National Park 756,000 2002 II 
3- Loango National Park 155,224 2002 II 
4- Akanda National Park 53,780 2002 II 
5- Pongara National Park 92,969 2002 II 
6-Plateaux Batéké National Park 204,854 2002 II 
7- Monts Birougou National Park 69,021 2002 II 
8- Monts de Cristal National Park 119,636 2002 II 
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9- Mayumba National Park 97,163 2002 II 
10-Ivindo National Park 300,274 2002 II 
11-Moukalaba Doudou National Park 449,548 2002 II 
12- Mwagné National Park 116,475 2002 II 
13- Waka National Park 106,938 2002 II 
Equatorial Guinea (12)      
1- Monte Alen National Park 200,000 2000 II 
2- Corisco e Elobeyes Natural Reserve 53,000 2000 IV 
3- Los Altos de Nsork National Park 70,000 2000 II 
4- Caldera de Luba Scientific Reserve 51.000 2000 Ib 
5- Rio Campo Natural Reserve 33,000 2000 IV 
6- Rio Muni Natural Reserve 60,000 2000 IV 
7- Playa Nendyi Scientific Reserve 500 2000 Ib 
8- Pico Basile National Park 33,000 2000 II 
9- Piedra Bere Natural Monument 20,000 2000 III 
10- Piedra Nzas Natural Monument 19,000 2000 III 
11- Isla de Annobon Natural Reserve 53,000 2000 IV 
12- Monte Telemon Natural Reserve 23,000 2000 IV 
Central African Republic (16)      
1- Bamingui- Bangoran National Park 1,156,000 1933 II 
2- Dzanga-Ndoki National Park 120,000 1990 II 
3- Manovo- Gounda- Saint Floris 
National Park 
1,740,000 1933 II 
4- Dzanga Sangha Special Reserve 315,900 1990 IV 
5- Mbaere Bodingue Integral Reserve 45,000 1996 II 
6- André Félix National Park 170,000 1940 II 
7- Vassako Bolo Integral Reserve 86,000 1933 Ia 
8- Bassa Lobaye Biosphere Reserve 14,600 1951 IV, V 
9- Ouandja Vakaga Wildlife Reserve 480,000 1939 IV 
10- Aouk Aoukalé Wildlife Reserve 330,000 1939 IV 
11- Gribingui Bamingui Wildlife 
Reserve 
450,000 1933 IV 
12- Koukourou Bamingui Wildlife 
Reserve 
110,000 1940 IV 
13- Nana Barya Wildlife Reserve 230,000 1953 IV 
14- Yata Mbaya Wildlife Reserve 420,000 1940 IV 
15- Zemongo Wildlife Reserve 1,010,000 1925 IV 
16- Avakaba Presidential Park 170,000 1968   
Democratic Republic of Congo (21)      
1- Salonga National Park 3,656,000 1970 II 
2- Virunga National Park 780,000 1925 II 
3- Okapis Wildlife Reserve 1,372,625 1992 II 
4- Luki Biosphere Reserve 33,000   II 
5- Garamba National Park 492,000 1938 II 
6- Maiko National Park 1,083,000 1970 II 
7- Kahuzi-Biega National Park 600,000 1975 II 
8- Mondo Missa Hunting Reserve 163,000 1974 VI 
9- Maîka-Penge Hunting Reserve 250,000 1951 VI 
10-Mangroves Reserve 76,000 1992   
11- Swa-Kibula Hunting Reserve 140,000 1952 VI 
12- Mangaî Hunting Reserve 36,000 1944   
13- Lubudi S Hunting Reserve 9,200 1959 VI 
14- Bushimaie Hunting Reserve 60,000 1958 VI 
15- Bili-uéré Hunting Reserve 6,000,000 1974 VI 
16- Bombolumene Hunting Reserve 350,000 1968 VI 
17- Rutshuru Hunting Reserve 100,000 1953 VI 
18- Luama-Katanga Hunting Reserve 343,500 1935 VI 
19- Rubi-Télé Hunting Reserve 908,000 1930 VI 
20- Kundelungu National Park 760,000 1970 II 
21- Upemba National Park 1,173,000 1939 II 
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Annex 2: List of institutions contacted for the interview 
Institutions Number of contacts made 
per institution 
Number of participations 
Cameroon 
ECOFAC 
WWF 
WCS 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
TNS 
CWAF 
 
1 
9 
3 
15 
1 
1 
 
1 
5 
3 
6 
0 
0 
Congo 
ECOFAC 
WCS 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
TNS 
PPG 
JGI 
HELP 
 
2 
6 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Gabon 
WWF 
WCS 
ECOFAC 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
FIGET 
CAWHFI 
ZSL 
Smithsonian Institute 
Max Planck Institute 
CADDE 
ASF 
PPG 
 
5 
12 
2 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
2 
1 
0 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Equatorial Guinea 
ECOFAC 
CI 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
Central Africa Republic 
WWF 
ECOFAC 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
GTZ 
RVDD/APDS 
 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
DRC 
WWF 
WCS 
ECOFAC 
Government (Conservators of PAs) 
DFGFI 
Care International 
FZS 
Gorilla Organization 
PICG 
WD 
ZSL 
APF 
CI 
PNUD 
Nature + 
AWF 
CAWHFI 
 
7 
3 
1 
14 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
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Annex 3: Questionnaire for protected area managers 
 
I- SHORT PRESENTATION OF THE PROTECTED AREA 
Name of the protected area:  
Location in the country:  
Area:  
Date of creation: 
Main resources preserved:  
Source of financing: 
(Please complete the presentation for the protected area that you support in management) 
 
II- EXISTENCE OF A MECHANISM OF DIRECT PAYMENT FOR BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION 
 
1- How do you proceed to encourage local population preserve biodiversity? Which activities are 
conducted to stimulate their participation in biodiversity conservation? 
 
2- Are there already situations where local communities receive a direct or indirect compensation 
for acting in biodiversity conservation? 
 
 
3- If not, do you think of setting up this kind of mechanism? 
 
 
4- What are the main constraints to the set up of direct payment for biodiversity conservation? 
End of for those who will not set up this kind of mechanism. 
 
III- DESCRIPTION OF THE MECHANISM OF COMPENSATION 
 
5- What biodiversity is concerned with the mechanism? Why did you choose it? 
 
6- Since when exist the initiative?  
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7- Who is funding this mechanism? How often are payments made? 
 
8- Who gave the idea of developing such a mechanism?  
 
9- Who are local actors involved in the mechanism and why did you chose these communities?  
 
10- How do they have clear, legal and secure customary rights on biodiversity? 
 
11- What is the amount of compensation and how was it defined? 
 
12- What are the terms of the deal with local communities? Who in concrete terms receive the 
compensations and in which nature?  
 
13- How are compensations linked to the level of biodiversity conservation? What conservation 
management practices are required from those receiving the compensation?  
 
14- Is biodiversity conservation service bundled with other environmental services (carbon, water, 
landscape…) in the deal? If yes, which ones?  
 
IV- UTILIZATION OF COMPENSATION FUNDS 
 
15- How do local people decide on how income from compensation funds will be spent? 
 
16-  What are institutions/organizations engaged in the payment scheme and what is their roles? 
 
17- What are the actual and future main risks associated with this initiative at local level? 
 
 
V- IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT  
 
18- Which mechanisms are set up to ensure the respect of the terms of the deal? 
 
19- Which mechanisms are set up to ensure the durability of the payment?  
 
20- Is there any involvement of the government in decreasing risks associated with payments for 
environmental services? 
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Annex 4: Questionnaire for survey of biodiversity conservation actors, non-
managers of protected areas 
I- EXISTENCE OF DIRECT PAYMENT FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION  
MECHANISMS 
 
21- What are the main measures generally used to encourage local people actively participate to 
biodiversity conservation? 
 
22- Do you think that Integrated Conservation and Development Projects have accomplished 
biodiversity conservation objective? Why? 
 
23- Do you think that community-based conservation initiatives have accomplished biodiversity 
conservation objective? Why? 
 
24- How do you think that payments for biodiversity conservation mechanisms can be 
implemented in Central African Countries?  
 
25- Do you know some current or future initiatives in Central Africa where local communities 
receive or will receive a direct compensation (in kind or cash) for their role in biodiversity 
conservation? 
 
If positive answer to the 5th question, please kindly continue the questionnaire. If not, it’s 
over.  
 
II- DESCRIPTION OF  COMPENSATION MECHANISMS 
 
26- For each direct compensation initiative, what element of biodiversity is concerned with the 
mechanism? Why?  
 
27- Where is located the initiative? On what area? Since when? 
 
28- Who is funding these mechanisms? How often are payments made? 
 
29-  Who gave the idea of developing such a mechanism? How was the amount of compensation 
defined? 
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30- How do beneficiaries of the compensation have clear, legal and secure customary rights on 
biodiversity? 
 
31- What are the terms of the deal with local actors? Who in concrete terms receive the 
compensations and in which nature?  
 
32- What is the link between these compensations and the level of biodiversity conservation? 
What conservation management practices are required from those receiving the 
compensation?  
 
33- Is biodiversity conservation service bundled with other environmental services (carbon, water, 
landscape…) in the deal? If yes, which ones? 
 
III- UTILIZATION OF COMPENSATION FUNDS 
 
34- How do local people decide on the use of income generated from compensation funds? 
 
35-  What are institutions/organizations engaged in the payment scheme and what is their roles? 
 
36- What are the actual and future main risks associated with these initiatives at local level? 
 
IV- IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT 
 
37- Which mechanisms are set up to ensure the respect of the terms of the deal? 
 
38- Which mechanisms are set up to ensure the durability of the payment?  
 
39- Is there any involvement of the government in decreasing risks associated with payments for 
environmental services?  
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Annex 5: Briefing note for questionnaire 
The present research is done in the framework of the project OFAC (Observatory of Central Africa 
Forests). It deals with the “Mechanisms of payment for environmental services (PES) of Congo Basin 
forests: the case of biodiversity conservation” 
 
PES constitutes a new form of financing biodiversity conservation with a dual objective of increasing 
conservation and improving livelihood of local communities. These are payments intended to promote 
environmental services, like biodiversity. As far as biodiversity conservation services are concerned, 
these are direct incentives (compensations in kind or in cash) that forest users receive to forego 
destructive practices or reduce some of their activities that are judged harmful to the biodiversity (see 
figure) 
 
 
 
 
Initial context: local communities use biodiversity for their well-being causing a threat on it. By the same 
time, international community would like to see this biodiversity be preserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final context with PES : local communities agree to preserve biodiversity by forsaking their customary rights, 
in exchange of a compensation coming from the service beneficiaries. 
 
 
Local 
Communities 
 
Biodiversity 
 
International 
Community  
Conservation Hunting 
Agriculture 
Logging 
Local 
Communities 
(Providers of 
the service) 
 
Biodiversity 
International 
Community 
(Beneficiaries of 
the service) 
Conservation Conservation 
(abandonment of 
customary rights) 
Biodiversity Conservation 
Compensation for abandonment of customary right 
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This type of mechanism is promoted today to improve the conservation of biodiversity existing in 
tropical forests, especially in Latin America. It differs from classical conservation strategies that are 
generally based on indirect incentives through which conservation is the secondary benefit of another 
activity. In this new mechanism, biodiversity conservation is directly targeted and constitutes the 
direct benefit of all activity conducted. 
The objective of the present research is to carry out an inventory and evaluation of initiatives of direct 
incentive for biodiversity conservation in Congo Basin, to draw up expected advantages and real 
limitations. 
This questionnaire is sent to biodiversity conservation actors in the region, mainly to « managers » of 
protected areas. It includes 20 questions and only 4 for those who do not intend to set up such a 
mechanism. Questionnaire should be filled out for each protected area separately.  
Do not hesitate to present for each protected area all the actual or future initiatives undertaken to 
compensate local communities, inciting them to keep intact natural ecosystems. 
Information got from this questionnaire will be subject of a strict scientific use. The result of this study 
will be sent to you and valued in the forthcoming State of Congo Basin Forests. 
 
Thank you for your collaboration 
 
 
 
 
